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The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death
Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and
Others
RODNEY

K. SM H*

INTRODUCTION

The American people take their sports very seriously. This seriousness,
coupled with an ever-increasing commercialization of organized amateur
sports at the intercollegiate level,' has led to a series of crises and has caused
a continuing mass of criticism to be directed at the National Collegiate
Athletic Association. 2
Indeed, by 1984, after the NCAA's control over the broadcasting of
football was successfully challenged by the College Football Association in
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1977, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; LL.M. 1982, University of
Pennsylvania; S.J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania.
The author acknowledges the contribution of his research assistant, Glenn Blackwell, and
his secretary, Bernice Mullins, and the support of Dean Anthony J. Santoro of The Delaware
Law School of Widener University.
1. In a recent study of revenues and expenses of football programs at institutions belonging
to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter "NCAA"), it was reported that
aggregate revenues totaled an estimated $1,064,749,000, an increase of over 48% over just four
years. Aggregate expenses, in turn, were estimated at $1.2 billion. See NCAA News, Nov. 3,
1986, at 14, col. 1. Indeed, the average income for football at Division I member institutions
had reached $3.4 million in 1984, with some programs generating in excess of $10 million in
gross income. See Christian Sci. Monitor, June 25, 1985, at 20. Intercollegiate basketball is
also a major revenue producer, as evidenced by the NCAA is recently negotiated $166 million,
three-year television contract with CBS for the right to televise the NCAA (Division I) basketball
tournament. See NCAA News, Jan. 14, 1987, at 2, col. 4. As Professor Scanlan has noted, it
is clear that "amateur sports in many important respects is a business, a highly specialized
industry which converts the raw material of athletic skill into a product which is customarily
sold in the competitive television market." Scanlan, Antitrust Issues in Amateur Sports, Introduction: Antitrust-The Emerging Legal Issue, 61 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1985).
2. United States Representative Thomas Luken of Ohio, for example, recently stated that:
[tihe unhappy fact is that the NCAA is not primarily concerned about kids who
pass through its sports factories. Athletics departments are expected to be financially self-sustaining, so the profit motive supercedes any concern for the intellectual development of the athletes. This breeds a corrupting and destructive drive
to win, regardless of the emotional, spiritual or educational cost to the student.
The hope of meaningful reform within the NCAA is chimera.
NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2, col. 2 (citing N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1986, at 23, col. I).
Criticism is not solely, or even primarily, directed at the NCAA, of course. Chancellor L. Jay
Oliva of New York University has emphasized that, "The University that allows itself to feed
off its sports program financially becomes dependent on the feeding-even addicted, if you
will. Breaking that addiction is a first responsibility." Oliva, A Challenge to Coaches: Special
OpportunitiesMust Not be Wasted, Sporting News, Dec. 1, 1986, at 32, col. 5.
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NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,3 and after the
NCAA had been severely criticized by the United States District Court of
Nevada in Tarkanian v. University of Nevada,4 one commentator noted that
the NCAA was in a crisis and "seemed to be on the ropes." ' 5 There was
some threat of a secession or exodus from the NCAA in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision regarding the NCAA's control over the
televising of college football.6 Even Walter Byers, Executive Director of the
NCAA, had suggested that perhaps the time had come to form an "open
division" in intercollegiate athletics.7 Byers implicitly recognized that sports
had become so commercialized at some institutions of higher learning that
it no longer was possible to assert that the amateurism goal of the NCAA
was viable or desirable at all levels of intercollegiate athletic competition.8
In January of 1984, however, the Presidents Commission of the NCAA, a
group of chief executive officers from member institutions within the NCAA,

3. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
4. No. A173498 (D.C. Nevada 1984). In Tarkanian, the court summarized its critical view

of the NCAA, noting that, "what started out as an association whose members met and
exceeded certain lofty goals, ended up as the NCAA bureaucracy which looks upon its friends
(sycophants) with feigned pleasure, and its enemies (those who still recognize the U. S. Constitution) with barely-concealed malevolence." Id., cited in Wong & Ensor, Recent Developments
in Amateur Athletics: The Organization'sResponsibility to the Public, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.J.
123, 164 (1985).

5. McCallum, In the Kingdom of the Solitary Man, Sports Illustrated, Oct. 6, 1986, at
64. McCallum argues that:
In 1984, the N.C.A.A. seemed to be on the ropes, as body blows rained down
from the Supreme Court (which had limited the NCAA football television
monopoly), the rival College Football Association (whose challenge led to the
Supreme Court's decision) and the district court in Nevada (which had ruled in
favor of UNLV Coach Terry Tarkanian in the well-publicized due process case).
Id. at 68.
6. The secessionist sentiment was perhaps higher in 1984, but it persists even today. The
College Football Association ("CFA"), for example, recently commissioned a blue-ribbon
committee to develop a long range plan for itself and its members, a plan which would examine
the possibility of having the "CFA expand its scope to include matters affecting all intercollegiate
athletics and other long-range issues." NCAA News, Oct. 13, 1986, at 4, col. 3. See also Koch,
The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 23 (1985), for a
discussion of the steps that necessarily would have to be taken to initiate a successful secessionist

movement from the NCAA.
7. Byers felt that an open division which essentially would professionalize amateur athletics

at some intercollegiate institutions, in a manner much like the increasing professionalization of
the Olympics, was a "valid proposal" and might be "in the best interest of ...those programs
that develop world-class athletes, forgoing all the administrative and enforcement strain that
is put on the system by the [current] rules of amateurism." McCallum, supra note 5, at 68.
8. The fundamental policy of the NCAA has been stated as follows:
The competitive athletics programs of the colleges are designed to be a vital
part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.
NCAA CoNsT. art. II,

§

2(a), reprinted in

NATIONAL

MANuAL OF THE NAT'L. COLLEIATE ATIETIc

COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc Ass'N., 1986-87

ASS'N. 7 (1986) [hereinafter NCAA MAquAL].
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was formed for the purpose of serving as an effective vehicle for addressing
policymaking and reform issues in intercollegiate athletics. 9 This body consistently has emphasized its commitment to ensuring the "integrity" of
amateur athletics at the intercollegiate level. 0
When the Presidents Commission initially was formed it was not given
veto power over NCAA actions, and, as a result, many believed that it
would remain "little more than an advisory panel, with limited authority to
review NCAA activity, sponsor changes in rules at conventions, and call
special conventions."" Such doubts, however, quickly were dispelled. Acting
promptly upon its formation, the Presidents Commission circulated a survey
to the chief executive officers of all NCAA member institutions. 2 Based on
the results of their survey, 3 the Presidents Commission proposed a sevenpoint plan for consideration at a special Convention to be held during the
summer of 1985, which plan was designed as a major step toward restoring
integrity to amateur athletics within the NCAA's jurisdiction. 4 A major
component of that seven-point plan came to be referred to as the "death
penalty," a sanction only to be applied to repeat offenders and which could,
if invoked in its most restrictive sense, suspend a particular athletic program
5
at an institution for up to two years.'
This "death penalty" was designed to bolster the NCAA's enforcement
capability. As such, it is intended to operate as a significant disincentive to
cheating by the personnel of member institutions in recruiting and other
activities designed to enhance and render more profitable the disobedient
institution's program. This Article discusses the content and ramifications

9. John W. Ryan, the first Chair of the Presidents Commission, stated that, "the Commission will demonstrate or fail to demonstrate ... that it is an effective vehicle for addressing
policymaking and reform issues in intercollegiate athletics." 1984-85 Au AL REPoTs oF Tm
NAT'L. COLLEGIATE ATImETic Ass'N. 229 (1986) [hereinafter

ANNUAL REPORTS].

10. NCAA News, Sept. 22, 1985, at 4, col. 1. In this address, Walter Byers, the Executive
Director of the NCAA, stressed how critical the role of the Presidents Commission would be
in the future given their avowed effort to maintain "integrity" in intercollegiate athletics.
11. Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 21, 1987, at 33, col. 2.
12. ANN AL REPORTs, supra note 9, at 188. This survey was circulated to get a sense of
the direction which the Chief Executives of the NCAA membership felt the Presidents Commission should take in its reform efforts and to ascertain the level of commitment of the Chief
Executive Officers to the reform effort generally.
13. The legislation ultimately drafted for presentation at the special Convention in June of
1985 "all was based on the results of th[is] survey .

. . ."

Id. at 227.

14. Id. at 260.
15. Barry Switzer, head football coach at the University of Oklahoma, recently emphasized
that, "They talk about the 'death penalty' being a two-year (maximum) proposition, but it's
more like a decade or more. It could put them (penalized programs) in doormat status for 10
years." NCAA News, Mar. 4, 1987, at 2, col. 1. See, e.g., summary of penalties invoked
against Southern Methodist University ("SMU") in a recent 'death penalty' determination by
the NCAA Committee on Infractions. Id. at 13, col. 1. David Berst, chief enforcement officer,
of the NCAA, adds that, "It would be difficult to start even a threshold program in the wake
of the death penalty." See Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 11, 1987, at 35.
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of this "death penalty" provision and related legislation adopted during the
special Convention in June of 1985.
In Part I, I will examine the history of intercollegiate athletics. In so
doing, it will become evident that many tensions, such as excessive commercialization versus amateurism, have plagued intercollegiate athletics from
its inception. Understanding those tensions, and their enduring quality, helps
to put recent efforts by the Presidents Commission in perspective and will
provide a touchstone from which to draw certain conclusions with regard
to what direction future reform should take.
I will turn in Part II to an examination of the specifics of the "death
penalty" and related legislation adopted by the Presidents Commission during
the special Convention. In that section I will discuss the legislative history,
the language of the provisions and interpretations that have been and might
be drawn from a close examination of those provisions.
In Part III, I will analyze how the Presidents Commission punished themselves and others in promulgating the "death penalty" and related legislation.
This part of the Article will comment on the nature, extent and ramifications
of the punishment applied to: (1) the presidents themselves (and their institutions); (2) athletic departments, athletic directors and coaches; and (3)
student-athletes.
Finally, in Part IV, I will draw some basic conclusions and will offer a
brief prognosis and a prescription for the future of intercollegiate athletics
generally and the role of the Presidents Commission and the NCAA specifically. In that conclusion, it will become clear why I believe there is room
for guarded optimism regarding the future of the NCAA and its goal of
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. It also will be argued that in their
willingness to make collective changes and reform the presidents must also
be attentive to the interests and rights of the various parties involved in the
enforcement process, particularly the student-athletes.

I.

A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE NCAA AND THE PRESIDENTS
COMMISSION

A.

IntercollegiateAthletics: The Early Years

In the 1840's, intraschool athletic competition was emerging as a significant
part of campus life.' 6 During this time, for example, a regatta between
Harvard and Yale Universities was organized and commercially sponsored

16. GEORGE MASON UNIV. & THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUC., ADMIN. OF UNIV. PROGRAMS: INTERNAL CONTROL AND EXCELLENCE 18 (1986) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION OF UNIV.
PROGRAMS].
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by the Elkins Railroad Line.' 7 It has been noted that even this event, "[like

modem collegiate contests ... was characterized by commercialization, crowds
of spectators, prize money and an eligibility question."'" In its zeal to win
this first intercollegiate athletic event, Harvard obtained the services of a
coxswain who was not currently a student. 9 Eligibility questions thus literally
have been with us from the inception of intercollegiate athletics. Indeed,

one author has emphasized that, "[t]he problem of misrepresentation, illegal
recruiting, and payment of athletes isn't a new one for big-time college
athletics . . . . Gymnasium walls have echoed with similar cries ever since
the humble beginnings of college sports ....
20

With the growth of intercollegiate athletics in the mid-nineteenth century,
questions arose with regard to the issue of control over intercollegiate athletic
events. Intercollegiate athletics initially were largely run by the students
themselves, with the team captain and the team manager serving in significant
capacities. 2' As financial demands and demands on the student-participants'
time increased, however, faculty members endeavored to exercise 22some control over the intercollegiate athletic program at their institutions.
The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, including the payment
of compensation to the best athletes, was well entrenched by the latter part
of the nineteenth century.3 Faculty members, nevertheless, continued to try

to exert control over their burgeoning athletic programs. Such efforts, predictably, encountered staunch and frequent resistance from presidents and
administrators who saw intercollegiate athletics as a profitable means of

17.
18.
19.
20.
21,

Id.
Id.
Id.
J. EvANs, BLOWING THE VISTLE ON INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 7 (1974).
See ADMINISTRATION OF UNIV. PROGRAMS, supra note 16, at 18, stating that:

The rowing clubs had set a precedent for student-run organizations in the early
days of intercollegiate athletics, raising their own funds, purchasing equipment,
and constructing facilities. In the 1850s the boating organizations were initiated,
coached, administered, and financed by students. The captain was indispensible.
He assured the continuance of the organization, served as its coach and administrator, organized fund raisers, and promoted his club; he was the sole arbiter
of the athletic program, although the team managers controlled the scheduling
of contests and the purse strings.
22. It has been pointed out that "With all the new activities, however, sports began to
challenge the academic curriculum for students, taking their time, interest, and effort. Faculty
then attempted to place student-run athletics programs under tighter educational control, and
the conflict over control of athletics began." Id.
23. It has been chronicled that during the latter part of the nineteenth century:
Hogan [a successful athlete at Yale] had a suite of rooms in the dorm, free
meals at the university club, a one-hundred-dollar scholarship, he could sell
programs and keep the profit, and was made an agent of the American Tobacco
Company, receiving a commission on cigarettes sold in New Haven, plus a 10day paid vacation to Cuba.
B.

SPEARS

& R.

SWANSON, HISTORY OF SPORT AmD PHYSICAL ACTVrY IN THa UNITED STATES

208 (1978), cited in ADMINISTRATION

OF UNIV. PROGRAMS,

supra note 16, at 19.
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placing their institution in the limelight, with resultant increases in admissions
and economic support.2 There were, no doubt, many faculty members during
this era, as there are today, who reveled in the emergent material and related
success of intercollegiate athletics at their institutions, just as there surely
were presidents who opposed such excesses. It is clear, however, that by the
latter part of the nineteenth century, when initial efforts to control the
excesses of intercollegiate athletics first were promulgated, that the very
tensions facing reform efforts in intercollegiate athletics today-commercialization, institutional pride and vacillation among faculty and administration relating to the purposes of intercollegiate athletics-constituted
significant impediments to those early reform efforts. Despite this fact,
efforts to form conferences and develop rules appropriate for intercollegiate
athletics were underway by 1895 and, in some sense, established initial
precedent for the ultimate creation of a national organization to regulate
athletics.2
Early in the twentieth century the reform movement received support from
an unsuspected source. In 1905, there were eighteen deaths and over one
hundred injuries in intercollegiate football. 26 As a result, President Roosevelt
called a White House conference for the purpose of reviewing football rules
and invited officials from selected major football programs to participate.
This first meeting did little to lessen the heavy toll, in terms of deaths and
injuries among athletes, in intercollegiate football. Thereafter, Henry
McCracken, Chancellor of New York University, pushed for a second national meeting of representatives of the nation's major intercollegiate football
teams to discuss reforming or abolishing football as it was being played at
institutions of higher learning in America. A group of representatives accepted McCracken's invitation and formed a Rules Committee. President
Roosevelt sought to have officials from the White House conference meet
with the McCracken group. 27 This solicitation ultimately led to a mutual
discussion and a combined effort to reform intercollegiate football rules.

24. This point is emphasized by ADMINISTRATION OF UNIV. PROGRAmS, supra note 16, at
19, in the chapter regarding the history of intercollegiate athletics:
Faculty had difficulty gaining control of athletic associations. At the time athletic
departments were forming, college presidents were in tune with materialism and
took the approach that athletics advertised the university and directly correlated
with increased enrollment. College presidents became active marketing agents for
athletics, attending games, speaking to victorious teams, and soliciting funds from
alumni and boards of trustees, while institutions began to provide money for
teams, absorb their debts, and grant scholarships. College presidents often sided
with development of athletics rather than with faculty.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 20. The officials from the White House conference initially refused to meet with
the McCracken group. A representative from Harvard finally left his group and went to attend
the McCracken meeting. See also G. ScHuBERT, R. SMrrH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 1-2
(1986).
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The association thus formed, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States, had sixty-two original members and, in 1910, was officially
renamed the NCAA. 21 As initially formed, the NCAA was only a rulemaking
body, formulating rules that would apply in various sports. It was, nevertheless, organized to eliminate "unsavory violence" and "preserv[e] amateurism." 2 9
B.

The NCAA: 1910 to the Present

In its early years the NCAA remained but a minor force in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics. Indeed, by 1921, when the NCAA began sponsoring its first national championship event, it had turned much of its energy
to its role in organizing and promoting championship events. 30 The actual
governance and running of intercollegiate athletic events remained largely in
the hands of the students until after World War I.31
In the 1920's, intercollegiate athletic participation truly became an integral
part of higher education in America. 32 Owing to its new found identification
with the higher educational system and with increasing commercial possibilities and pressures, 33 intercollegiate athletics once again was subjected to
a period of significant outside criticism. In 1929, in a three-year study by
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education, the following
finding was made:
[A] change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the
commercial and the material and the vested interests that these forces
have created. Commercialism in college athletics must be diminished and
college sport must rise to a point where it is esteemed primarily and
sincerely for the opportunities it affords to mature youth ... to exercise
at once the body and the mind and to foster habits [of] both bodily
health and ...high qualities of character .... 34

The Carnegie Report essentially concluded that, if the college presidents so
desired, they "could change the policies permitting commercialized and professionalized athletics that boards of trustees had previously sanctioned." 35
During the 1920's and 1930's, little of real significance transpired in terms
of gaining control over the commercial and related excesses already plaguing
28. ADMInSTRATI N OF UNIV. PROGRAMS, supra note 16, at 20.
29. Koch, supra note 6, at 12.
30. By 1941, the NCAA offered championship events in ten different sports. See G. SctuBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTrADuE, supra note 27, at 2.
31. ADMIDTISTRATION OF UNIv. PRoGRAs, supra note 16, at 21.
32. Id.

33. In 1930, for example, Notre Dame University's football program had a gross income
of $689,000. See CONG. Q., Aug. 15, 1986, Vol. 11: No. 6, at 591.
34. Cited in ADmamsTmAnoN OF UNIV. PROGRAMS, supra note 16, at 22.

35. This conclusion arguably was and presumably is naive. Id. I agree with the conclusion
of the Carnegie Report, however, that the presidents are well-suited to make needed educational
reforms in intercollegiate athletics.
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intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA, nevertheless, still attempted to restructure recruiting rules to maintain some semblance of educational integrity in
their programs. 6 During this period, coaches and administrators also began
to take a major role in operating and recruiting for their intercollegiate
athletic programs.3 7 Throughout the 1930's, the federal government under
the New Deal also took an active role in promoting athletics.3 8
After World War II, intercollegiate athletics expanded at a frenetic pace
fueled by the return to the college ranks of many servicemen, the era of
post-war prosperity and the introduction of television. In the midst of this
apparent boon, college athletics faced a series of major gambling scandals.39 During this turmoil, the NCAA took a number of steps that ultimately
enabled it to exercise greater control over rapidly expanding athletic programs
at many institutions of higher learning.
In 1948, the NCAA enacted what has come to be known as the Sanity
Code, which was promulgated to "alleviate the proliferation of exploitive
practices in the recruitment of student-athletes. ' 40 In order to enforce the
Sanity Code, the NCAA initially created a Constitutional Compliance Committee to interpret the rules and to investigate possible violations. 4' The
Sanity Code and the Compliance Committee enjoyed little success, however,
because expulsion from the NCAA was the only penalty provided for in the

36. Id.at 23.
37. Red Grange, a football coach, is generally given credit for "starting the competition
for football talent through ... recruiting." Id. at 21. Additionally, it has been pointed out
that:
The 1930s also brought a demand for graduate work to develop coaches for
particular sports. The new emphasis on preparing athletes in physical education
also fostered the need for coaches trained in particular areas. Physical education
instructors were being replaced by professionals trained for a particular sport,
thus perpetuating the professionalization of intercollegiate athletics.
Id. at 23.
38. Id.
39. Referring to gambling scandals:
The first case surfaced in 1945, when a team was caught shaving points to keep
the spread margin down. The worst incident, however, was in 1951, when a major
gambling scandal involving thirty players and seven schools came to light. The
schools had conspired to fix games (although coaches all denied any knowledge
of the incident).
Id. at 23-24.
40. Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental Fairness and the
Enforcement Problem, 23 Aiuz. L. Rav. 1065, 1070 (1981). Gaona summarizes these developments:
For over forty years, the NCAA had existed as an advisory association prior
to its engaging in the business of regulation. The presence of elements such as
gambling, financial aid to student-athletes, and the development of air transportation made a rules enforcement mechanism necessary. The "Sanity Code" (Code)
thus was adopted in 1948 to alleviate the proliferation of exploitive practices in
the recruitment of student-athletes.
Id.
41. Id.
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event that a violation was uncovered. 42 Repealed in 1951, the Sanity Code
was replaced with a new set of enforcement procedures and with the creation
of the Committee on Infractions, an enforcement body given additional
43
authority to penalize members involved in rules violations.
Two other significant factors in the NCAA's formative development
occurred during the 1950's: (1) in 1951, the NCAA began to function as a
wholly separate organization, and Walter Byers commenced his tenure as
Executive Director of the NCAA; 44 and (2) in the early 1950's, the NCAA
negotiated its first contract to televise intercollegiate football, valued at over
one million dollars. 45 By 1952, Byers also had helped establish the enforcement division of the NCAA which was formed for the purpose of working
46
with the Committee on Infractions in the enforcement process.
Armed with a new power base, the NCAA began to exercise greater control
over intercollegiate athletics. With financial support provided by its share
of the television contracts and with its increasingly forceful role in infractions
matters, the NCAA came to play a dominant role in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics. The early seventies witnessed the divisionalizing of
college athletics. Ostensibly, this effort at federation was conceived as a
means of enhancing enforcement by placing institutions of similar size in
the same division and for the purpose of maintaining a similar level of
competitiveness among member schools in a given division. 47
With each increase in its power base, the NCAA seemingly was confronted
with criticism from a new quarter. Whereas the NCAA initially was criticized
as being little more than an advisory figurehead, by 1971 members were
beginning to voice concerns regarding alleged unfairness in the rules and the
enforcement process. 41.By the 1970's the NCAA thus found itself effectively

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. McCallum, supra note 5, at 70. McCallum adds that:
Whatever anyone thinks of Byers' long reign, there can be no doubt that the
beginning of his administration also marked the beginning of the NCAA's modern
era. "The NCAA prospered, in my opinion, because of these factors," says Big
Ten Commissioner Wayne Duke, who was the first NCAA employee Byers hired
in 1952. "Enforcement, football on television and the basketball tournament.
And Walter was the architect of all three."
Id.
45. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRNrADnuE, supra note 27, at 2.
46. McCallum, supra note 5, at 70.

47. See ADMINISRATON OF UNIV. PRoG"RAms, supra note 16, at 24. I say "ostensibly,"
because it is clear that federation has contributed to some problems that may well have been
unanticipated by the NCAA (e.g., ultimately, the creation of Division I-A status in football
and basketball, placed additional stress on some programs to maintain lucrative and competitive
programs).

48. Gaona summarizes this criticism as follows: "In 1971, major institutions voiced concern
regarding the unfairness of the procedures and tactics by which the Committee on Infractions
operated. The major complaint was that the Committee's involvement in the entire investigative
and basketball placed additional stress on some programs to maintain lucrative and competitive
programs).
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caught in a crossfire of converging criticism. On the one hand, the NCAA

was criticized on the ground that their enforcement efforts were unfair.
When, in 1976, the NCAA was given additional power to enforce the rules

by penalizing schools directly and therefore administrators, coaches and
student-athletes indirectly, 49 this line of criticism grew in force. On the other

hand, criticism surfaced anew asserting that intercollegiate athletics had been
commercialized to the point that it was little more than a big business

masquerading as an educational enterprise.50 In some respects, particularly
with regard to the apparent dehumanizing effect of "unfair" rule enforcement and extreme commercialization on student-athletes, and less so coaches,
5
these lines of criticism converge. '

Concerned with this criticism of its enforcement procedures, the NCAA
formed a special committee to study the enforcement process. This com-

mittee, in turn, recommended amendments designed to divorce the prosecutorial role from the investigative role in the Committee on Infractions.

These recommendations were adopted in 1973.52 These efforts at internal
reform, however, did not quell the criticism. By 1978, at the insistence of
53
Representative James Santini of Nevada and seventy other Representatives,
a seventeen member U.S. House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-

gation held hearings to investigate the NCAA and the alleged unfairness of
its enforcement procedures and processes.14 The Subcommittee heard a parade of witnesses who were generally critical of the NCAA. The JCAA
ultimately responded to the thrust of much of this testimony by amending
portions of its procedures. Again, however, criticism did no/t'abate.
Commentators 6 and Congress 57 alike have continued to harangue the NCAA

49. See ADmNisTRATIoN OF Umv. PRoGRAms, supra note 16, at 24.
50. See, e.g., J. EvA~s, supra note 20, J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN ANMERICA (1976); G. SHAw,
MEAT ON THE HOOF: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF TEXAS FOOTBALL (1972); J. ScoTT, THE ATHLETIc
REVOLUTION, for books of this genre written during the 1970's. Each of these books also raised
the dehumanizing effect of commercialized athletics on the participants, the student-athletes.
51. There is a good deal of ambivalence in the criticism directed against the NCAA. Some
argue the NCAA is weak and lacks the resolve to do what is necessary to ensure integrity in
intercollegiate athletics while others claim that the NCAA is too strong and exercises power
unfairly. To some extent these criticisms converge in that it is evident that the NCAA and its
members wield extensive power relative to student-athletes but may lack the power and resolve
necessary to deal with the powerful groups that reap the rewards of a highly commercialized
role for intercollegiate athletes.
52. See Gaona, supra note 40, at 1071.
53. Id. at 1067, n.15.
54. McCallum, supra note 5, at 77.

55. See NCAA Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
56. See, e.g., Brody, NCAA Rules and Their Enforcement: Not Spare the Rod and Spoil
the Child-Rather Switch the Values and Spare the Sport, 1982 Asuz. ST. L.J. 109; Miller,
The Enforcement Procedures of the NationalCollegiate Athletic Association: An Abuse of the
Student-Athlete's Right to Reasonable Discovery, 1982 Apiz. ST. L.J. 133; Wong & Ensor,
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enforcement process. During the spring of 1986, with the drug-related death
of Len Bias, and the revelations regarding classroom attendance by Mr. Bias
and other athletes at the University of Maryland, the clamor for reform
reached a heightened pitch. 58 Indeed, with the issue of academic integrity in
intercollegiate athletics in the media on virtually a daily basis, a critical
report from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching was
issued. That report called on faculty and students to "organize a day of
protest" over abuses in athletic programs and also urged major sports powers
to cut their athletic budgets. 5 9
Such clamor and criticism again evoked a reform-oriented response from
the NCAA and also from the presidents of a number of its major members.
In 1984, during an era when funding for higher education from all sources
was tightening and many institutions were faced with the spectre of decreasing
enrollments, numerous presidents found themselves under intense pressure
leveled from opposing camps. On the one hand, the presidents have been
subjected to significant pressure from alumni and boosters, from influential
members of their boards of trustees and from some state legislators, who
in large measure control the budgets of public institutions, to produce winning athletic programs. 60 On the other hand, the presidents have been accosted on occasion by irate faculty and other groups demanding that the
institutions recognize their academic mission by de-emphasizing major, "winning" athletic programs which had become all too commercial in appearance
and function.6" Caught in the vice between these and similar pressure

The NCAA's Enforcement Procedure-Erosionof Confidentialy, 4 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1
(1985).
57. See, e.g., Representative Luken's addition to the recent Omnibus Drug Bill providing
for a special Commission to study intercollegiate athletics, discussed infra note 295 and accompanying text. See also NCAA News, Jan. 21, 1987, at 3, col. 1, for an article discussing
Representative James Howard's bill, as introduced in the 99th Congress, which challenges the
NCAA relative to graduation rates for student-athletes.
58. See, e.g., Chron. Higher Educ., July 2, 1986, at 17.
59. NCAA News, Nov. 10, 1986, at 20, col. I. The NCAA, with the Presidents Commission
as henchman, recently has taken steps to ensure cost containment in the running of intercollegiate
athletic programs. See, e.g., infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
60. In the words of Walter Byers, "[t]he one serious factor that interferes with institutional
resolve and management integrity is the pressure brought to bear by certain influential donors,
some members of boards of trustees and an occasional important state legislator, who believe
that athletics success at at their favored institution is worth whatever it takes." NCAA News,
Sept. 22, 1986, at 4, col. 3.
61. Faculty members at SMU, for example, have remained adamant in their desire to have
SMU's economically successful, but NCAA violation-riddled, football program dismantled. See
Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 11, 1987, at 35-36. Similarly, the faculty at Auburn University
voted to censure Pat Dye, the university's successful football coach, for permitting a studentathlete to play in a holiday football game, despite the fact that the athlete had not attended
class since October. Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 18, 1987, at 30.
Byers recognized this dilemma facing presidents when he stated that:
It is difficult sometimes for a chief executive who longs for funds to build a
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groups, and no doubt desiring to ensure at least a preponderance of academic
integrity in their athletic programs, the presidents determined that they should
take an active, collective role in the NCAA. The presidents noted further
that reform efforts at the institutional level-where the pressure to maintain
highly profitable winning athletic programs was clearly at odds with a growing sentiment opposing the commercialization of intercollegiate sports-were
likely to be successful at many institutions only if there was a collective
effort at the national level. 62 In an early meeting of the Presidents Commission, one of its members echoed this sentiment by emphasizing that:
Some observers ask why, if the C.E.O.s want to take over, they don't
start by dealing with the problems on their own campuses; however,
anyone who is cognizant of the competitive pressures of major athletics
programs realizes that effective controls cannot be implemented individually or unilaterally and all-encompassing actions are needed.63
In a provocative article criticizing the NCAA's enforcement process, Professor Burton Brody argued that the NCAA operated under the "association
syndrome," which was defined as "the ability of a group [the NCAA] to
hold values that no single member of the group has or, at least, would admit
to having .... Under the 'association syndrome,' the sum is not greater
than the parts; it is different from any of the parts." 64 It seems that just
as the NCAA membership might use the "association syndrome" in a pernicious way to promote collectively values that no individual institution would
admit to holding, it can also, as in the case of the Presidents Commission,
use that same syndrome to promote collectively values, such as academic

new science building to offend one of those power-brokers by directing him not
to have a hand in the operations of the athletics program. And it is because of
this leverage situation that the popular, unprincipled head coach gets what he
wants by dealing directly with the big-time supporter, bypassing the university
and athletics administration. The work of the NCAA Presidents Commission and
the forces it has brought into play provide a unity of purpose for chief executive
officers to deal with this longstanding problem.
NCAA News, Sept. 22, 1986, at 4, col. 4. It also has been stated that "Many Presidents will
be opposed and attacked by powerful forces of great influence. Real courage will be required
to overcome their increased sense of vulnerability. Their strength to act and persevere will have
to come from their unified front and an appreciative public." Harwood, The Presidents Will
Need Courage, Determination, NCAA News, Jan. 1, 1987, at 3, col. 1. I doubt that many
vocal and partisan members of the public will appreciate the presidents' efforts to present a
unified front against athletic abuses if such efforts mean that the winning tradition of their
individual programs suffer. Indeed, the threatening nature of this win-at-all-costs phenomenon
recently was illustrated by the death threats received by President Joab L. Thomas of the
University of Alabama when he hired Bill Curry of Georgia Tech University. Curry, who is
reputed to be an excellent coach, had a losing record of 31-43-3 at Tech. Curry had been hired,
in part, because of his record on academic and related issues of integrity. Some groups,
nevertheless, were impervious to Curry's excellent credentials as a coach, choosing to focus
solely on his won-lost record.
62. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
63. AN uAL. REPORTS, supra note 9, at 258-59.
64. Brody, supra note 56, at 110 n.5 (emphasis in original).
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integrity in their athletic programs, that could not be promoted as a political
matter in individual cases on their campuses, where the pressure of powerful
alumni, boosters, legislators and trustees is intense and where such powerful
individuals occasionally use their positions to coerce or cajole "wayward"
6
presidents.
In 1984, the presidents therefore resolved to act collectively at the national
front. At first there were serious doubts that the presidents would exercise
anything but the most rudimentary advisory power in the councils of the
NCAA. Such sentiment was a natural reaction to the fact that the presidents
had failed to win veto power over NCAA legislation in their- formative
efforts."6 Nevertheless, after circulating a survey to its members seeking input
as well as political and moral support on various issues confronting the
NCAA, the Presidents Commission exercised its power to call a7 special
convention to be held in June of 1985. The presidents were committed to
and did in fact take steps during that special Convention to ensure "academic
integrity" in their athletic programs.6 7 Shortly thereafter Doug Tucker, a
sportswriter for the Associated Press, indicated that, "[tihere is no doubt
who is running the show in college sports. It's the college presidents." 6 In
that article, President Gene Budig of the University of Kansas was quoted
as saying that he believed, "presidential unity is essential .... University
presidents and chancellors must sound a clear message of the importance of
propriety in intercollegiate athletics." ' 69 President John W. Ryan, Chair of
the Presidents Commission, reflected that the presidents should "think about
the impossibility of what the Presidents Commission [had] done in just one
year. ' 7 0 Indeed,, the Presidents Commission had taken a major step toward

65. Former SMU President Paul Hardin, for example, stated that he effectively was forced
from his position as president because he supported efforts to "clean up" the SMU football
program. Hardin's assertion was denied by Ed Cox, ex-chairman of the Board of Governors
during Hardin's tenure. See A Fine Kettle of SMU Fish, Sporting News, Mar. 23, 1987, at 43.
Regardless of which version is accurate, it is clear that presidents often perceive an intense
pressure to "look the other way" if that is what is necessary to provide a "winning" athletic
program for their institution on a regular basis.
66. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
67. Reacting to these early efforts by the Presidents Commission, the NCAA Council
"agreed that the success of [the Presidents Commission's] proposals [adopted during the special
Convention in June of 1985] represented a meaningful first step in the effort to address the
integrity issue in college athletics." ANmuAL REPORTS, supra note 9, at 305. Some members
suggested, however, that no "integrity problem exists in college athletics, noting that 'the closer
a CEO is to the facts, the less concerned he is.' Id. at 232. But this position was countered
by the fact that "the survey data, in effect, show that 75 percent of the chief executives perceive
that 25 percent have a problem." Id. See also ADMUST.AnON OF UNIV. PRooRAMS, supra note

16, at 3, for reference to a study indicating that 92% of the CEO's believe there are major
problems, with 33% believing that there are problems at their institution and with 22%
acknowledging that there are serious problems at their institutions.
68. Associated Press, June 22, 1985.
69. Id.
70. AtouAL REPORTS, supra note 9, at 300.
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exercising control over intercollegiate athletics. It is now unlikely that the
presidents will be able to ignore their responsibility regarding the governance
of intercollegiate athletics. 71 It is little wonder, therefore, that Walter Byers
recently referred to the Presidents Commission in emphasizing:
That's where the big effort is being made right now ... with the Presidents' Commission. This involvement augers well for the future, but it

[also] marks one of the most significant developments in a number of
years. The C.E.O.s are determined to change the course of intercollegiate
momentum,
athletics. I feel good about this, and, if this effort maintains
72

the future looks better than it [did], say, five years ago.
Today the Presidents Commission clearly is a dominant force in the NCAA.
While I tend to share some of Walter Byers's sanguine views regarding the
influence of the Presidents Commission, the future is somewhat uncertain.
This is so because the resolve of the presidents to deal collectively with
economic and related pressures at the institutional and the national levels
remains unclear. Historically, it would appear that the presidents tend to
serve best, or at least most often, as crisis managers and worst, or least
often, as overseers of the "nuts and bolts" of their various programs,
particularly intercollegiate athletics. 73 Without attention to detail it is conceivable that the presidents' power may slip through their hands as they no
longer sense the exigency of a crisis in need of their intervention. Unless
major institutional changes are implemented in a largely irreversible manner,
intercollegiate athletics may return, as it has in the past, to its highly commercial pre-crisis status in which academic concerns are subordinated to
economic values and under which academic institutions will be criticized
anew for hypocritically abandoning their academic mission in the pursuit of
economic splendor in athletics. Finally, as will be indicated in the remainder
of this Article, it is not clear what impact the reforms promulgated during
the summer of 1985 will have, nor is it clear that all of those reforms will
have a salutary effect or that they can have such a beneficial impact without
significant, continuing presidential attention and increased resolve to finish
a task half-done.
II.

THE NCAA's VERSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY-ITS
HISTORY AND CONTENT

A.

The History Prior to the Special Convention of 1985

At the Presidents Commission Executive Committee meeting on March
21, 1985, in Chicago, Illinois, John W. Ryan, Chair of the Presidents
71. The Presidents Commission during the January 1987 Convention of the NCAA again
called for a special Convention during the summer of 1987 to consider cost containment issues.
See infra note 241 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of this assertion of the
Presidential prerogative.
72. McCallum, supra note 5, at 68.
73. ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 9, at 305. The presidents must depend on others for "nuts
and bolts" analysis.
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Commission, summarized the recent accomplishments of the presidents. 74
President Ryan then added that the chief executives of member institutions,
through the Presidents Commission, intended to continue to take an active
role "in integrity issues." 75 On April 3, 1985, at the next Presidents Commission Executive Meeting, "[i]t was emphasized that the suggested legislation for possible sponsorship by the Commission all was based on the
results of the survey [that had recently been circulated to the chief executive
officers of NCAA member institutions] .... "76
As President Ryan noted, prior to forming the Presidents Commission in
1984, the presidents began by taking an active role in supporting Proposal
48. Proposal 48, which was adopted by the NCAA membership in January
of 1984, amended NCAA Bylaw 5-1-0). As amended, this bylaw sets forth
academic eligibility requirements for participation in intercollegiate athletics
by high school graduates in their first year of college. Proposal 48 requires
that high school graduates have maintained a 2.000 grade point average
(based on a maximum of 4.000) in a successfully completed core curriculum,
as well as a 700 combined verbal and math S.A.T. score or a 15 composite
score on the A.C.T. 77 The presidents supported Proposal 48 as an initial
step in their effort to ensure academic standards by requiring that basic
academic requirements be met before a freshman athlete would be permitted
to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level. The adoption
of that provision provoked criticism on the ground that it violated the
fourteenth amendment because its enforcement would have a disparate im78
pact on Black and other minority student-athletes.
In 1984, the chief executive officers took a major step toward gaining a
significant degree of direct control over the governance of intercollegiate
athletics by organizing the Presidents Commission and having it formally
recognized by the NCAA. As initially organized, Commission members were
elected by a mail vote of the chief executive officers of all NCAA member
institutions. Forty-four members were elected, twenty-two representing the
Division I membership, eleven representing Division II members and eleven
representing Division III members. 79 A minimum of three women must be
included on the Commission, preferably with at least one from each divi-

74. Id. at 225-26. By way of example, President Ryan cited the adoption of "Proposal
48," establishment of the Presidents Commission and completion of the most comprehensive
survey in history of presidential views regarding athletics.
75. Id. at 226.
76. Id. at 227.
77. See NCAA Bylaw 5-1-0), reprintedin NCAA MAmuAL, supra note 8, at 95-96.
78. See, e.g., Yasser, The Black Athletes' Equal Protection Case Against the NCAA 's New
Academic Standards, 19 GONZ. L. REv. 83 (1983). As discussed infra notes 286-303 and
accompanying text, in their zeal to protect the value of academic integrity, the Presidents
Commission and the NCAA must be particularly sensitive to the interests of student-athletes,
who tend to be particularly under-represented in the NCAA rule promulgation and enforcement
processes.
79. ANHuAL REPoRTs, supra note 9, at 14.
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sion. 80 The representatives of each division are to be elected to four-year
terms by the chief executive officers of that division, and the officers of the
Commission are to be elected by a majority vote of the other members of
the Commission and are to serve for two year terms.8 '
When formed in 1984, the Presidents Commission was given the following
powers:
(1) Review any activity of the Association;
(2) Place any matter of concern on the agenda for any meeting of the
Council or for any NCAA Convention;
(3) Commission studies of intercollegiate athletics issues and urge certain
courses of action;
(4) Propose legislation directly to any Convention;
(5) Establish the final sequence of legislative proposals in any Convention agenda, within the provisions of Section 2-(e) of the Special
Rules of Order; and
(6) Call for a special meeting of the Association under the provisions
of Constitution 5-7.82
In January of 1985 a seventh power was added: the power to "[d]esignate
prior to the printing of the notice of any Convention, specific proposals for
which a roll-call vote of the eligible members will be mandatory."" 3 The
Presidents Commission, furthermore, "in cooperation with the NCAA Council, shall determine appropriate arrangements for liason and exchange of
information between the two bodies." '8 4 The Presidents Commission held all
of these powers prior to the special Convention in June of 1985. Indeed, it
was under article V, section 4(d)(6) that the Presidents Commission exercised
its power to call the special Convention. Since that special Convention the
Presidents Commission's power has been further augmented that chief executive officers now attend and participate in NCAA meetings on a regular
basis, thus becoming informed as to the work of the NCAA. 5
As President Ryan noted, the Commission's first significant move was to
prepare a survey in October of 1984 to determine the views of chief executive

80. Id. It is clear that women have been under-represented at all levels within the-NCAA
hierarchy although there have been some efforts, as in the case of the election of members of
the Presidents Commission, to ensure proportional representation. See, e.g., Tokarz, Separate
But UnequalEducationalSports Programs:The Need for a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 201 (1985), for an article depicting the extreme under-representation of women
in all facets of intercollegiate athletics.
81. Id. See also NCAA CONST. art. V, § 4, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at
40-43.
82. NCAA CONST. art. V, § 4(d), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 42.
83. NCAA CONST. art. V, § 4(d)(7), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 42.
84. NCAA CONST. art. V, § 4(f), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 43.
85. The Presidents Commission, for example, recently was given veto power over the
selection of Executive Director of the NCAA. Given the power of the Executive Director, and
with the pending retirement of Walter Byers, this veto power is significant and indicates a
trend toward augmentation rather than diminution of the Commission's power.
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officers regarding the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 6 The survey,
which was completed early in 1985, served as the basis for legislation 15res
sented at the special Convention, including the so called "death penalty."
After the call for the special Convention was issued in January of 1985,
and with receipt of the survey results in March of that year, the Executive
Committee of the Commission met on March 21, 1985, and outlined the
basic legislative proposals which it would support in the upcoming special
Convention. The Executive Committee then directed 88the NCAA staff to
prepare draft legislation to effectuate those proposals.
The Executive Committee met again on April 3, 1985, and re-emphasized
that the draft legislation was based on the results of the recent survey and
further agreed that "the executive committee should be authorized by the
Commission [at its meeting on April 3-4, 1985] to approve any revisions in
the proposed legislation by the April 21 deadline for submission of legislation
[to be considered at the Special Convention]." ' 9 In turn, the Presidents
Commission itself met on April 3-4, 1985, to review the draft legislatioi
prepared by staff at the direction of the Executive Committee at its March
21, 1985 meeting. At that April meeting the Commission considered the
reactions of various division subcommittees to fifteen items of proposed
legislation.9"
The first change suggested by the respective subcommittees concerned the
"repeat violator" legislation designed to punish habitual offenders. 91 Considerable discussion ensued in each subcommittee over this provision, the
so-called "death penalty." At one point, during the Division I subcommittee
meeting, it was "emphasized that the point of the proposal was to streamline
the enforcement procedure, resulting in actions that are more prompt and
decisive, and to provide more stringent penalties in cases of major and
repeated violations." 92 Much dialogue centered on the issue of defining or

86. ANNuAL REPORTS, supra note 9, at 246.
87. Id. at 227, 246.
88. Id. at 229. In that March 21, 1985 meeting, the Executive Committee also discussed
issues regarding the hiring and firing of coaches and the need to have coaches report outside
income. These issues resurfaced in January of 1987, when the Presidents Commission again
called for a special Convention to be held during the summer of 1987 to consider economic
or cost-containment issues and to commence a dialogue regarding the appropriate role of
athletics in the academic environment. During 1985, however, the presidents did not promote
the consideration of economic issues, focusing rather on "integrity" issues related to enforcement
and control of intercollegiate athletic programs.
89. Id. at 227-28.
90. Id. at 230.
91. This provision, in its entirety, was ultimately adopted in June of 1985 as § 7-(d) of the
NCAA Enforcement Procedures and has been referred to as the "death penalty."
92. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 234. Elsewhere,
[i]t
was noted that [the] proposal was intended to establish distinctions between
'major' and 'secondary' violations of NCAA rules and regulations, to establish
specific penalties for certain categories of violations and to authorize the assistant
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clarifying "major" and "secondary" violations under the proposed legislation. In this regard, "[iut was clarified that the references to 'secondary'
and 'major' in the proposal did not anticipate dividing NCAA rules and
regulations into such categories, but [was merely intended] to differentiate
between major and lesser violations." 9 3 At the Division I subcommittee
meeting, several members "suggested that the need may develop to provide
sample cases or examples of the differing types of violations." 94 With regard
to the nature of the penalty for violations, one member also suggested that
a monetary fine should be imposed, but this suggestion was rejected on the
ground that "institutions in the past have expressed a willingness to 'pay.to
get out of trouble,' as a 'cost of doing business."' 95 The subcommittees
suggested that the "repeat violator" provisions should "be applied to an
institution with a second major violation in a five-year period, regardless of
whether it was in the same sport as the initial violation. Sport-specific
penalties in the repeat-violator provisions would be applied to the sport
involved in the second violation. ' 96 The Division I subcommittee also favored
adjusting the legislative draft "to specify that repeated secondary violations
should be considered a major violation. ' 9 7 It also asked that "major violations be more specifically defined in the legislation." 98 Additionally, the
Division I subcommittee advocated that:
a penalty be added to the minimum package of penalties in major
violations to specify that all institutional staff members who were found
to have engaged in or condoned a major violation would be subject to
termination, suspension without pay for at least one year, or reassignment
to institutional duties that do not involve contact with any prospective
or enrolled student-athletes or any representatives of athletics interests
for at least one year."

executive director for enforcement to impose penalties for secondary violations,
subject to an appeal to the committee on Infractions.
Id. at 236. Albert Witte of the NCAA Council subsequently questioned this "authority for the
staff to impose penalties," but his uneasiness was countered by the proposition that the
Committee on Infractions would review every staff decision in this regard and the institution
"could appeal any staff action to the Committee on Infractions." Id. at 247.
93. Id.at 233.
94. Id. at 234. These members also agreed that, "a more precise definition of 'major
violations' should be included in the proposed amendment." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 230.
97. Id. See also id. at 234.

98. Id. at 230.
99. Id. At the Division I subcommittee meeting:
It was noted that 86% of the chief executives responding to the Commission
sponsored survey favored procedures that would require suspension or dismissal
of coaches found guilty of major or repeated violations, and President Peter
Likins urged that such a procedure be added to the proposal as a penalty in both
major and repeated violations.
Id. at 234. The subcommittee agreed "to recommend such a provision for major violations,
but not for repeated violations." Id.
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After some discussion, during which "[One member spoke against the
proposed change in the repeat-violator provisions, and another spoke against
the proposed penalty on institutional staff members,"' °° the Presidents Commission voted to sponsor the proposed repeat-violator legislation together
with the suggested changes, each of which served to strengthen the provision
as a whole in terms of the stringency of its punitive effect.
The Commission also discussed and supported minor modifications regarding the academic reporting (requiring reporting of academic information) 1° 1 and the self-study (requiring institutions to prepare a self-study of
their athletic programs on a regular basis) 0 2 legislative proposals. During
the April meeting the Commission further agreed that "the results of the
self-study must be available for examination upon request by an authorized
representative of the NCAA," and I.M. Heyman, Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, "expressed the hope that the self-study
will be the first step in moving toward some type of visitation review or
accreditation procedure."' 0 3
The Division I subcommittee also spent time discussing "a proposed resolution regarding student-athlete eligibility, restoration of eligibility and
granting of immunity to student-athletes."'04 After it was pointed out that
"limited immunity" for student-athletes was only granted by NCAA personnel when the information could not be obtained from any other source,
the subcommittee recommended that the resolution be revised and that the
council be directed "to prepare legislation regarding student-athlete accountability in cases of knowing involvement in violations."' 05
All three division subcommittees supported Commission sponsorship of
"amendments to Bylaw 5-6-(d)-(3) and Enforcement Procedure 7-(b)-(12) to
require that any restrictions imposed upon an institution's coaching staff
member by the Committee on Infraction or as a result of the Association's
'show cause' provisions must be applied to the coach even if the individual
is employed at some other institution."'106 The Commission supported this
amendment, but decided to postpone consideration of whether or not such
a provision should also apply to any athletic department member.
The Commission likewise supported amendments requiring that the annual
budget for the athletic department be controlled by the institution and that

100. Id. at 230.
101. It was agreed that graduation data for student-athletes would be accumulated on a
sport-by-sport basis and according to field of study. Id.at 234.
102. One alternative self-study proposal would have put off implementation of the self-study
proposal until 1986, while another called for immediate implementation. The latter prevailed.
See id.at 234-35, 237, 247.
103. Id.at 231.
104. Id.at 235.
105. Id.See also id.at 248 for Council action on this resolution.
106. Id.at 231. There was also some discussion regarding the belief that presidents should
exercise more authority in the hiring and firing of coaches. See, e.g., id.at 238.
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an annual audit be performed by an outside party."°7 Finally, the presidents
voted to support a resolution opposing any increase in the permissible number
of contests or dates of competition in any sport. 05 In his closing remarks
at the April Presidents Commission meeting, President Ryan reiterated that
the "university presidents have very serious concerns regarding the conduct
of intercollegiate athletics, that presidents are going to be involved in the
solutions to the concerns, and that the presidents are able to dictate principles
and policies in that regard."' 9
Indeed, in their April meeting, the presidents had indicated their commitment at the national level to specific and potentially quite stringent
legislation designed to bolster integrity in intercollegiate athletics. As previously noted, the Council, 10 in turn, met on April 15-17, 1985, and agreed
to co-sponsor each of the eight proposals proffered by the Presidents Commission for submission to the NCAA membership at the upcoming special
Convention."' At that meeting, the Council also reviewed a document regarding integrity and compliance in intercollegiate athletics, which document
outlined a seven-point program: (1) to rejuvenate the members' resolve to
abide by the applicable rules of intercollegiate athletics; (2) to help put into
place the necessary institutional, conference and national machinery and
administrative techniques necessary to support the efforts of the presidents;
and (3) to reiterate the Council's commitment to the NCAA's amateurism
rules.11 2 The first portion of the recommended program suggested that the
3
Council support all eight of the proposals of the Presidents Commission."
The second segment provided for a one-time affidavit to be signed by head
coaches and student-athletes to attest to current compliance with applicable
rules." 4 In support of this proposal, it was noted that difficulties in achieving
compliance with the NCAA's financial aid rules are exacerbated by successful
coaches of major programs and powerful boosters who are inclined to ignore
or bend rules in the interest of providing a winning program." 5 President
John R. Davis also stated that:

107. Id. at 231.
108. Id. at 231-32.
109. Id. at 232.
110. The NCAA Constitution provides that, "[t]he establishment and direction of the general
policy of the Association in the interim between conventions is committed to a Council of 46
members, which shall be elected at the Annual Convention of the Association." NCAA CONsT.
art. V, § 1, reprinted in NCAA MAruAL, supra note 8, at 36. The Council is clearly a major
force in effectuating NCAA policy.
111. ANNuAL REPORTs, supra note 9, at 246-48.
112. Id. at 258.
113. Id. at 259.
114. Id. It also was noted that the affidavit would require more detailed information than
the current coaches' Certification of Compliance with NCAA rules. The Division I Steering
Committee voted to recommend Council sponsorship of the proposed legislation. Id. at 260.
115. Id. at 259.
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the efforts of those attempting to suggest that student-athletes are employees of the institution, or otherwise increase markedly the aid and
benefits the athletes receive, could contribute to institutions losing control
of their athletics programs and would directly contradict the clear message
from the chief executive officers that the
Association's current ama6
teurism precepts should be maintained."
The third phase of the program provided for mandatory compliance and
on-campus visitation program by all Division I conferences to alleviate problems arising from inconsistent attention to rules adherence by the conferences.117 In a related context, step four provided for a substantial and more
detailed revision of the compliance certification and student-athlete statement
forms which would involve appropriate interrogation of each head coach
and each student-athlete regarding athletic financial aid issues." 8 The fifth
and sixth points dealt with health, gambling and drug issues and supported
a drug-testing program as a conceptual matter." 9 The seventh and final point
dealt with possible "deregulation" or moderation of some of the NCAA
rules.22 With its co-sponsorship of the eight-proposal package of the Presidents Commission, and the Division I Steering Committee's support of this
seven-point program on integrity and compliance, the Council also went on
record in support of the efforts to reform the enforcement and compliance
process to ensure that integrity could be retained or recaptured. This strong
statement by the Council made clear that there would be a unified effort
on the part of the Presidents Commission and the Council at the upcoming
special Convention on June 20-21, 1985.
B.

The Special Convention: The Proposals of the Presidents
Commission Are Enacted

By June of 1985, the Presidents Commission was prepared to take a
historic first step toward asserting control at the national level over issues
confronting intercollegiate athletics. While this Article focuses on the socalled "death penalty," it is also necessary to examine the other proposals
adopted in conjunction with that proposal at that summer meeting to better
understand the Presidents Commission's intentions in developing a system
designed to ensure integrity and compliance in intercollegiate athletics at the
NCAA level.

116. Id. It also was mentioned that "only 13 percent of the respondents (12% in Division
I and 17% in Division I-A) favored any increase in the grant limitation." Id.
117. Id. at 260. This program was discussed at some length and was favored as a means of
securing compliance of the conferences with the Presidents Commission in implementing this
program.
118. Id. The Steering Committee also supported this concept.
119. Id. at 260-61. The Steering Committee also endorsed these proposals.
120. Id. at 261. This proposal also was favored by the Steering Committee.
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In examining what transpired at this historic meeting, it is helpful to look
at the proposals presented and the debate that ensued on each proposal in
a seriatim fashion. The first proposal considered at the special Convention
amended article IV, section 2, of the NCAA Constitution by adding a new
paragraph (b), which would require NCAA members:
To conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation of their intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five years in a form
prescribed by the NCAA Council. Subjects covered by the self-study
shall include institutional purpose and athletics philosophy, the authority
of the chief executive officer in personnel and financial affairs, athletics
organizations and administration, finances, personnel, sports programs,
recruiting policies, services for student-athletes and student-athlete profiles. The report of the self-study and supporting documentation shall
be available for examination upon request by an authorized representative
of the NCAA.21
This legislation was to be effective August 1, 1986, and was approved by a
vote of 418-6.122 As adopted, the expressed intent of this proposal was "[tlo
require an institution as a condition and obligation of membership in the
Association to conduct a self-study of its intercollegiate athletics program
at least once every five years, with the form and supporting information to
be available for examinations by an authorized representative of the Asso1 23
ciation."
The self-study proposal had been a near-unanimous item of concern to
the presidents.' 24 As such it stimulated limited discussion. The major point
raised was the hope that ultimately the athletic self-study would become a
component of the accreditation process. 25 There was also some concern over
the timing issue-when the self-study should be completed-but doubts in
this regard were allayed by noting that the self-study could be completed at
any time within five years after August 1, 1986, the effective date of the
proposed amendment. It, nevertheless, was clearly the hope of many members
that the self-study would be completed the first year after the forum was
126
made available.
The second proposed amendment, 12 dealing with academic reporting as
amended by Proposal No. 2-1,I28 was approved by a vote of 283-4. The

121. NCAA CONST. art. IV, § 4(2)(b), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 31.
122. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 5TH SPECIAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, June

20-21, 1985, at app. 1 [hereinafter CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS].
123. Id.
124. Id. at 35.
125. See, e.g., id. at 37; ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 9, at 298-99.
126. See, e.g., CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 36; ANNUAL REPORTS, supra
note 9, at 302.
127. This proposed amendment to NCAA Bylaw 5-6-(e), which was to be effective Aug. 1,
1986, provided in pertinent part as follows:
(e) A member institution's chief executive officer shall provide the following
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express intent of this proposal was stated as follows: "[t]o establish an
academic reporting program that would require Division I member institutions to report annually information concerning entering freshman, compli-

information annually [not later than October 1] on a form approved by the NCAA
Council.
(1) A statement of the institution's regular, published entrance requirements for admission of regularly matriculated, degree-seeking students,
including any authority for the acceptance of students who could not be
enrolled in the institution if special action is not taken on their admissions
applications; the total number of entering recruited student-athletes, the
number of entering recruited student-athletes accepted under the special
authority, the total number of entering students and the number of entering
students accepted under the special authority;
(2) In the sports of football and men's basketball, the following information for each entering recruited student-athlete (listed individually but
anonymously): (i) the student's specific high school grade-point average
utilized to meet the 'qualifier' definition set forth in Bylaw 5-10); (ii) the
student's score on the SAT or ACT; (iii) an indication of whether the
student was a regular or special admittee, and (iv) the specific school,
college or department of the institution to which the student is admitted;
(3) The total number of recruited student-athletes in each sport who
represented the institution in intercollegiate competition during the previous
academic year and the number who either graduated, left the institution
in good academic standing and having met the satisfactory-progress requirements for eligibility if the student had returned for the current academic year, or returned to the institution and met the satisfactory-progress
requirements for continuing eligibility;
(4) The institution's graduation rate for recruited student-athletes in each
sport and the graduation rate for students generally for the entering freshman class that began attendance as full-time, regularly matriculated, degreeseeking students at the institution five years prior to the regular term that
includes the October I deadline established in paragraph (e)... ;
(5) Identification of the specific baccalaureate degree programs of studies
pursued by the student-athletes, included in the graduation rate information
under subparagraph (4), who graduated and an indication of the number
that obtained a degree in each of those programs;
(6) The NCAA Council shall compile promptly the reported information
(with institutions listed individually but anonymously) and shall distribute
the compilation annually to all member institutions of Division I... ;
(7) Failure to file the form by the appropriate deadline shall render the
institution ineligible to enter a team or individual competitors in an NCAAsponsored meet or tournament.
CoNVENTIoN PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at app. 2-3; NCAA Bylaw 5-6-(e), reprinted in
NCAA MAuA, supra note 9, at 113-14.
128. Proposal No. 2-1, NCAA Bylaw 5-6-(e)-(3), amending Proposal No. 2, provided that:
(3) The total number of recruited student-athletes in each sport who represented
the institution in intercollegiate competition during the previous academic year
that began two years before and the number who either graduated, left the
institution in good academic standing and having met the satisfactory-progress
requirements for eligibility if the student had returned for the currentfollowing
academic year or returned to the institution and met the satisfactory-progress
requirements for continuing eligibility
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at app. 4 (emphasis in original).
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ance with continuing eligibility requirements, and graduation rates for recruited
student-athletes and students generally to the Association in order to be
eligible for NCAA championship competition."1 29 In presenting this proposal
on behalf of the Presidents Commission, the Very Reverend J. Donald Moran
of Boston College noted that:
This proposal responds to the desires of more than 70 percent of the
Division I presidents requesting the establishment of an academic reporting system. I personally believe it is going to contribute dramatically
toward understanding what should be our greatest concern as presidents
-namely, the academic status of our student-athletes from the day of
their arrival to their hoped-for graduation and of the quality of academic
programs they pursue.
I do not believe it is understood publicly that within the American
educational system, and consequently among our members, there is extraordinary heterogenetic academic mission and goals of academic programs. I believe that the information provided in this proposal will
provide a new understanding of the commonality of our academic interests and of their immense differences sometimes within the same
institution. It will enable us to determine to what extent the academic
treatment accorded athletes fits nationally within the diversity of our
academic programs and clienteles, or whether they compromise our fundamental academic standards.10
Based on Father Moran's comments, the statement of intent, the language
of the proposal itself and the data that will be gathered as the proposal is
implemented, this proposal may provide fodder for further changes in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level.
During the consideration of this second proposal two concerns were voiced.
First, there was concern over the timing of the reporting requirement. The
Pac-Ten Conference argued that it would be unable to supply the information
when required since classes do not start at some of its member institutions
until October and it would not, therefore, be able to report whether or not
their student-athletes were enrolled.1 31 This problem ultimately was resolved
by amending the proposal to provide that the information regarding recruited
student-athletes would refer to "the previous academic year that began two
years before."' 32 Second, questions were raised as to whether the reporting
of graduation and related statistics on a sport-by-sport basis would lack
anonymity and would, therefore, violate the privacy rights of individual
student-athletes under the Buckley Amendment. 33 This potential problem

129. Id. at app. 1.
130. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 37-38.
132. See supra note 128.
133. CONVENTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 40. As D. Alan Williams of the University
of Virginia noted:
This is precisely a question that we had because of the Freedom of Information
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was deflected by noting that the NCAA Council would review this issue and
by adding that it might be possible to lump basketball and football players
134
together for such reporting purposes, thereby assuring anonymity.
After adopting Proposal No. 2, as amended, the members began consideration of Proposal No. 3, the "death penalty." The expressed intent behind
this proposal was:
[t]o establish distinctions between "major" and "secondary" violations
of NCAA rules and regulations, to establish specific penalties for certain
categories of violations (including repeated violations), to authorize specific disciplinary or corrective actions for institutional staff members
found in violation of NCAA regulations and to authorize the assistant
executive director for enforcement to impose penalties for secondary
violations subject to an appeal to the Committee on Infractions. 35
The essence of this proposal was set forth in a proposed amendment which
would add sections 7-(c) and (d) to the NCAA Enforcement Procedures.
The first paragraph, section 7-(c), provides for a minimum penalty for a
"major" violation:
(c) The minimum penalty for a major violation, subject to exceptions
authorized by the Committee on Infractions in unique cases on the basis
of specifically stated reasons, shall include:
(1) A two-year probationary period (including a periodic inperson monitoring system and written institutional reports);
(2) The elimination of all expense-paid recruiting visits to the
institution in the involved sport for one recruiting year;
(3) A requirement that all coaching staff members in the sport
be prohibited from engaging in any off-campus recruiting activities
for one recruiting year;
(4) A requirement that all institutional staff members determined
by the Committee on Infractions knowingly to have engaged in or
condoned a major violation be subject either to termination of
employment, to suspension without pay for at least one year or
to reassignment of duties within the institution to a position that
does not include contact with prospective or enrolled student-athletes or representatives of the institution's athletics interests for at
least one year;
(5) One year of sanctions precluding postseason competition in

Act in the state of Virginia. All Division I institutions in Virginia now have been
requested by one of the newspapers to provide precisely this information without
regards to this particular one. What we have discovered is it is exceedingly difficult
if you have a small category, in this case basketball, where you have one, two
or three recruits in a given year, and then you add to that other special requirements
such as those who might be specially admitted.
Id. It is unfortunate that the involved universities only appear to be concerned about issues of
student-athletes' rights (e.g., privacy) when these rights have immediate legal implications for
the institution itself. See infra notes 268-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
and related issues.
134. CoNVmNON PRocEEDmIs, supra note 122, at 41.
135. Id. at app. 3.
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the port;
(6) One year of television sanctions in the sport; and
(7) Institutional recertification that the current athletics policies
and practices conform to all requirements of NCAA regulations.''
The second paragraph sets forth a stringent punishment scheme for "repeat," "major" violators and contains provisions whose severity has caused
them to be referred to as the "death penalty," providing as follows:
(d) An institution shall be considered a "repeat" violator if any "major" violation is found within the five-year period following the starting
date of a "major" penalty. The minimum penalty for a repeat violator,
subject to exceptions authorized by the Committee on Infractions in
unique cases on the basis of specifically stated reasons, shall include:
(I) The prohibition of some or all "outside" competition in the
sport involved in the latest major violation for one or two sports
seasons and the prohibition of all coaching staff members in that
sport from involvement directly or indirectly in any coaching activities at the institution during a two-year period;
(2) The elimination of all initial grants-in-aid and all recruiting
activities in the sport involved in the latest major violation in
question for a two-year period;
(3) The requirement that all institutional staff members serving
on the NCAA Presidents Commission, Council, Executive Committee or other committees of the Association resign those positions, it being understood that all institutional representatives shall
be ineligible to serve on any NCAA committee for a period of
four years; and
(4) The requirement that the institution relinquish its voting
privilege in the Association for a four-year period.137
Given the severity of the penalty scheme set forth in this portion of the
proposal, it is surprising that it did not elicit significant negative response,
and the entire proposal, as amended, was approved overwhelmingly by a
vote of 427-6.13 There were, however, occasional objections to the effect
that the penalties were too stringent. 3 9 Chancellor Heyman commented on
these objections when he stated:
I have heard people talk about the heaviness ... of the minimum
penalties that are put forth in this legislation, especially the ones for
repeated major violations. They are heavy penalties .... The survey of
the presidents clearly indicated that . . . [harsh] penalties for violations
were very much desired.
In fact, No. 3 probably does not go as far as a number of presidents
wished with respect to penalties. That survey indicated to me that stiff
penalties, meaning full penalties, . . . were essential to protect the integ-

136. Id. at app. 6.
137. Id. at app. 6-7.
138. Id. at app. 7.
139. See, e.g., ANNUAL
122, at 43, 66.

REPORT,

supra note 9, at 299;

CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS,

supra note
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rity of our institutions, and after all that is really what the special
Convention is about.'Q

This argument, based on the survey results, seemed to quiet, if not4 satisfy,
detractors who had argued that the penalties were unduly severe.' '
Other issues, however, particularly with regard to how and by whom the
provisions would be interpreted, were raised and discussed at length. The
major question posed centered on the distinction between "major" and
"secondary" violations, and the generality of language used to define them.
The only definition offered in the legislation itself was in the form of
an amendment adding paragraph (d) to NCAA Enforcement Procedure
section 2:
(d)Upon review of information developed by the investigative staff
or self-reported by the member institution, the assistant executive director
for enforcement shall identify the charges as involving alleged "major"
or "secondary" violations. A "secondary" violation is one that provides
only a limited recruitingor competitive advantage, and which is isolated
or inadvertent in nature. All other violations, specifically including those
that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive advantage, shall be
considered "major." Further, the assistant executive director for enviolations by a member
forcement may identify repeated "secondary"
2
institution as "major" violations.'1

In this regard, Chancellor Heyman recognized that the language of Proposal
No. 3 was "not very precise, in fact, quite imprecise, with regard to distinguishing between secondary and major situations, defining the line between
the two because we know there are minimal penalties stated here; and the
penalties for major violations, and, certainly repetitive major violations, are
' 43
stiff indeed.'
The response to these objections was essentially twofold. First, Chancellor
Heyman noted that:
When the President Commission was considering this proposed legislation
it found it very difficult to definitively decide what acts are secondary

140. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 43. See also id. at 66, where Chancellor

Heyman again addressed the severity objection by reemphasizing the results of the recent survey:
There was overwhelming support for really stiff penalties in the presidents' survey.
That was at the 80-to-85 percent level. So, there was very little doubt in our
minds in drafting this legislation that such penalties were needed.
The reason for that overwhelming support was the perception by the Presidents
Commission and those completing the survey instrument that such major penalties
are essential to protect the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.
141. I am struck by the fact that neither at the Presidents Roundtable nor during the debate
on the floor itself were there any discussions of an academic nature regarding the theory of
punishment being invoked. See infra notes 235-44, 286-87, and 305 and accompanying text,
for a fuller discussion of this and related issues.
142. CONVENTION

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 122, at app. 5. (emphasis added).

143. See id. at 42-43, for Chancellor Heyman's comments at the General Round Table on
Tuesday afternoon, June 19, 1985. Chancellor Heyman also recognized similar concerns at the
Business Session on Friday morning, June 22. Id. at 65.
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and what acts are major, especially without being able to see those acts
in the context in which they would occur.
Consequently, the staff, the Committee on Infractions and the Council,
all of whom will be involved in these deliberations and determinations
over time, [in] really a common law way, will build up the list of things
that are secondary and the things that are major.'Second, recognizing that because he was a "presenter" his comments would
45
"become part of the legislative history of this proposal if it is passed,'
Chancellor Heyman endeavored to clarify the meaning of the distinction
between "major" and "secondary" violations, by stating that:
The determination of the classification would be based not only upon a
review of the particular regulation that has been violated and the extent
of the violation, but also would depend upon other relevant and mitigating factors in this specific case, such as the reasons why the violations
occurred, the intent of the individuals involved, the previous record of
findings and more. 14
In discussing mitigating and relevant factors, Chancellor Heyman pointed
out that:
Such factors include the reasons why the violations occurred, the intents
of the individuals involved, the previous record of findings of violations
involving the individual or institution and the corrective or disciplinary
actions taken by the institution or its conference. I think that is very
important because we do not want to undercut the active involvement
of conferences with respect to endorsement [sic] and policing. The distinction between secondary and major violations is to be based in part
on the analysis of those infractions cases during the past 10 years that
have resulted in actions by the Committee on Infractions to impose
penalties involving both a period of probation and sanctions relating to
television appearances in postseason events.
Those cases that have resulted in penalties involving a probationary
period of no more than one year with no television or postseason sanctions would be considered generally to involve findings of secondary
violations. 147
Even this explanation was so general that Chancellor Heyman felt compelled
to offer additional examples. He began by describing scenarios of what

144. Id. at 43. In this regard, Paul Regel of the College of William and Mary stated that:
[i]t
might be wise if the Council would accept this not only to develop a common
law with respect to the nature of violations that are secondary rather than major,
but also .to publish from time to time, rules that indicate what those violations
are and how they look, because they will change over time.
Id. at 46. See also comments regarding the development of such a common law, id. at 65.
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id. Elsewhere, Chancellor Heyman added that, "[a] secondary violation is defined as
one that provides only a limited recruiting or competitive advantage and which is isolated or
inadvertent in nature. All other violations, specifically including those that provide the extensive
recruiting and competitive advantage, are to be considered as major." Id. at 65.
147. Id. at 65-66.
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"we" (evidently referring to the Presidents Commission), consider to be
"secondary" violations:

Those would include but would not be limited obviously to, first, the
provision of local automobile transportation in the hometown of the
prospective student-athlete, or a clerical error that resulted in limited
practice for competition of a student-athlete while enrolled in less than
a full-time academic load; the entertainment of the prospective studentathlete with the prospect's family members for a meal under circumstances unrelated to an expense-paid visit to the institution; improper
publicity regarding the commitment of a prospective student-athlete, or
a clerical error or misinterpretation of an NCAA rule that results in
practice or play during the first year in residence by a nonqualifier or
transfer student; the incorrect calculation of the starting date of the
preseason practice season; the failure to notify a student-athlete that the
individual's grant-in-aid will not be renewed; the failure to notify the
individual of the appropriate hearing opportunities related to the financial
aid renewals; isolated or inadvertent violations of NCAA regulations
governing recruiting contact and evaluation periods, or technical violations of the NCAA tryout rule, and limited violations of the NCAA's
out-of-season practice regulations. Those are a good enough set of examples.
You can see that if we really had to codify all of these in the legislation,
the legislation would be endless. But that gives you a course set of what
we have in mind with regard to secondary violations.141

Then, referring to cases decided by the Committee on Infractions during the
past ten years, he said that:
major violations would include, but not be limited to, such things as the
following: violations of the provision of NCAA Constitution 3-3-6-(a),
that is ethical [sic] conduct by student-athletes, institutional staff members
or athletics representatives that are designed to conceal the disclosure of
the active information regarding alleged violations; the promises or arrangement of benefits involving substantial material value for prospective
or enrolled student-athletes; an extensive pattern of secondary violations
that resulted in a substantial recruiting advantage to the institution; the
alteration of academic records to the purpose of circumventing institutional, conference or association eligibility standards, and institutional
decisions to refuse to apply applicable eligibility regulations in accordance
membership. Those are examples
with the conditions and obligations of
9
of what we would consider major.'

148. Id. at 66. It is unfortunate that Chancellor Heyman included "the failure to notify a
student-athlete that the individual's grant-in-aid will not be renewed" and the "failure to notify

the individual of the appropriate hearing opportunities related to financial aid" as examples

of secondary violations. Such disregard of student-athletes' basic due process rights are regrettable and the institutions should not be informed that such violations are so insignificant
as to be examples of secondary violations. With the move to reduce the number of scholarships,
problems with regard to nonrenewal will be exacerbated and the need for a modicum of due
process will be intensified. See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text for a further discussion
of due process and related objections.
149. CoNVETnoN PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 66 (emphasis added).
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An examination of Chancellor Heyman's comments clearly leads to the
conclusion that the distinction between "major" and "secondary" violations
remains nebulous, perhaps necessarily so.150 At one point, for example,
Chancellor Heyman noted that "[a] secondary violation is defined as one
that provides only a limited recruiting or competitive advantage and which
is isolated or inadvertent in nature. All other violations, specifically including
those that provide an extensive recruiting and competitive advantage, are to
be considered major.' ' 51 There is a broad spectrum between "limited" and
"extensive," but the gap between these two qualifying terms is not filled
with differing degrees of violations-a violation only can be "major" or
"secondary." Of course one might argue that this ambiguity supplies the
Committee on Infractions necessary latitude to mete out justice; however,
particularly in the case of student-athletes and coaches, who can now be
directly punished under these provisions,'5 2 there is little notice and limited
precedent regarding the nature of given violations. 5 3 Chancellor Heyman,
nevertheless, was able to minimize concerns of the membership on this issue
and the legislation was passed overwhelmingly. It is, however, an area that
will surely provoke future problems as the anticipated common law develops.
In a related sense, there was concern over the extent of power delegated
to the NCAA staff to ascertain whether a given violation was "major" or
"secondary."'- 5 4 Initially, there was concern that, "in the definition of the
processing of secondary violations . . . the NCAA staff has [been given]
too much authority, and that the staff is both the investigat[or] and also
the judge with regard to what are classified as secondary violations."' 55 In
response to this objection, the Council:
proposed an amendment ... requiring that the chair of the Committee
on Infractions or another member of that Committee designated by the
chair has to approve [such] actions by the assistant executive director
for enforcement before they become operative.
In other words, this will bring the Committee on Infractions in through
the chair or representative so that it requires the consensus of the two
in order to proceed with regard to violation and punishment.156

150. I say necessarily because it is clear that there needs to be ample flexibility in the
application of these rules to achieve justice in individual cases by taking into consideration
mitigating factors, institutional and conference efforts, the cooperation of the institution, the
intent of the parties, the needs of student-athletes, etc.
151. Id. at 65.

152. See infra notes 264-82 and 286-302 and accompanying text.
153. See id. for a discussion of the grave need on the part of the NCAA to be sensitive to
due process and fundamental fairness concerns, particularly in the formative years as precedent
develops.
154. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 42, 66.
155. Id. at 42.
156. Id.
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Most staff-related objections were satisfied by the adoption of these
amendments1 7 and by adoption of an amendment to NCAA Bylaw 9-5-(d),
which provided for notice and appeal to involved institutions of any specific
58
charges related to an investigation by staff for secondary violations.'
Another key issue arose over the question of timing. Issues were raised
as to whether the five year period would apply retroactively, and, if so, in
what manner. President Davis, in answering a question regarding to what
extent the repeat violator provisions of Proposal 3 would apply if the legislation were adopted, indicated that:
These provisions would apply under certain circumstances to previous
infractions cases. This would be any institution that has been involved
in a major case prior to this special Convention, and a major case is
defined as a case that resulted in a penalty involving at least a one-year
probationary period and sanctions prohibiting either television or postseason appearances, those institutions that have that case countable toward the double major penalty if the second major infractions case is
processed to completion by the Committee on Infractions within five
years of the date the penalties started in the first case.
For example, an institution that received a major penalty in November
1980 could fall into the double major category only if a second major
case involving the institution was processed to completion by the Committee on Infractions by November 1985. We intend to report this interpretation directly to every institution involved in a major infractions case
during the five years. Every institution should know where it stands.
An appeal of an infractions case to the NCAA Council would not set
aside the timing element in this interpretation unless the Council determined not to uphold the findings, i.e., the penalty imposed by the
Committee on Infractions. But in any case, the double major legislation
would not be applicable until the second case was initiated by official
inquiry filed after September 1, 1985.119
Edward T. Foote II, of the University of Miami, noted that he was
surprised to learn of the Council's interpretation regarding retroactive application of the severe penalties in Proposal 3.' 60 Foote stated that he had
"assumed that the normal principles governing the changes in the law in
the retrospect to application of the law would apply,"' 6' and added that:

157. See id. at app. 4 for sections amended.
158. This amendment provided, in pertinent part, that:
a member under investigation for secondary violations:
(1) Shall be given notice of any specific charges against it and the facts
upon which such charges are based, and
(2) Shall be given an opportunity to provide a written response to the
assistant executive director for enforcement (or appear before the Committee on Infractions upon appeal) to answer such charges by the production
of evidence.
Id.
159. Id. at 44.
160. Id. at 47.
161. Id.
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I am particularly surprised now to learn that the interpretation of the
Council itself that has now suggested formally on behalf of the institution
that these penalties, which most people would agree are indeed severe
and are proposed for the first time, would apply retrospective in the
nature of ex post facto application of the law. This may well be one of
the most important points that we debate tomorrow.
Therefore, I would like to know.., what were the reasons that
prompted the Council to come up with this retrospective interpretation
of what I would say on its face appear to be something else.162
President Davis responded by discussing and quoting from the opinion of
legal counsel on the matter:
In the law of status, it generally is held that remedial or procedural
status, which do not affect investigated rights, operate retrospectively
and are applicable to pending actions or proceedings. Proposal No. 3 is
remedial or procedural legislation even though substantial interests may
be affected because no member could have a vested right arising out of
violations of Association rules. There also are cases in the securities field
that hold that where a statute is remedial in purpose it should be broadly
construed to effectuate its purpose. Thus, the new legislation could on
the basis of those principles be applied to any pending cases.
Then counsel goes on to say it is inappropriate to apply the new
legislation to cases where the old procedures have been initiated. So, it
should be understood that the effective date of September 1, 1985, has
this effect on institutions generally throughout Proposal 3. If an institution has received its official notice prior to September 1, 1985, then
the old policies apply. On the other hand, if an institution receives its
official notice of violations subsequent to September 1, 1985, then the
new procedures and penalties are applicable.
The counsel goes on to say with regard to the major violations: "In
applying the new procedure, major violations occurring prior to September 1, 1985, should be considered in determining whether or not a member
is a repeat violator, otherwise, there would be a lengthy or unnecessary
delay in the implementation of that legislation and many repeat violators
would escape the stiffer penalties. This would seem in the minds of the
counsel to be contrary to the intent of the members in making the
legislation effective September 1, 1985."163
Chancellor Charles Young of the University of California at Los Angeles
offered an amendment that had been unanimously adopted by the Pac-Ten

Conference limiting what that conference believed to be questionable aspects
of retroactive application of the strictures of Proposal 3.16 Chancellor Young
stated that:

162. Id. at 47-48.
163. Id. at 48.
164. With as many as five member schools in the Pac-Ten Conference affected by potential
retroactive applications of Proposal No. 3's penalty provisions regarding repeat violators, it
was not surprising that the conference opposed the Council's initial interpretation. See, e.g.,
Associated Press, Aug. 17, 1985; L.A. Tnvis, June 21, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
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We in the Pac-10 have discussed this matter and believe that retrospective application is at least questionable, if not inappropriate, and
have proposed an amendment to the amendment that would add at the
end of the first sentence in subparagraph (d), "which it is imposed after
September 1, 1985" to make clear that the period would begin running
September 1, 1985, and any two major infractions occurring after that
date within a five-year period would result in the penalty that would be
required for a repeat offense but would not take into account actions
that had occurred in the past when this penalty did not exist and was
not known to those, therefore, who might have been involved in some
kind of problem.'1
Chancellor Young and the Pac-Ten subsequently agreed to withdraw their
proposed amendment opposing the Council's initial interpretation regarding
the retroactivity in the belief that "the most onerous aspects of the retroactivity have been eliminated."'6 As revised and accepted by the Pac-Ten, the
Council's interpretation was summarized as follows: "[T]o be considered as
a repeat violator the second major offense must be one that occurs after
September 1, 1985, and within five years from the starting date of the major
penalty. That is the interpretation that was adopted by the Council with the
concurrence of the Presidents Commission." 67 This interpretation made clear
that the second major violation would have to occur after September 1,
1985, whereas under the initial interpretation questioned by the Pac-Ten,
the second major violation need only be "processed to completion by the
Committee on Infractions within five years of the date the penalties started
in the first case." Questions remain, however, regarding the fairness of such
retroactivity, together with possible double jeopardy issues, particularly as
to a coach who may be penalized in a more stringent fashion for being
involved in a second major violation even though the coach was not involved
in the first major violation. In such a situation, the coach would effectively
be punished more severely for the violation than she would if the violation
68
had been the institution's first violation within a five year period.1
This observation raises two further, related objections proffered at the
special Convention: (1) the fact that the provisions applied directly to coaches,
and (2) potential due process problems. Coaches were to be directly covered
for the first time under an amendment to article 3, sections 2-(d) and (e)
of the NCAA Constitution:
(d) Institutional staff members found in violation of NCAA regulations
shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the
provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedure, whether such violations
occurred at the certifying institution or during the individual's previous
employment at another member institution.

165.
166.
167.
168.

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 44.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64-65.
See infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
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(e)Contractual agreements between a coach and an institution shall
include the stipulation that a coach who is found in violation of NCAA
regulations shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set
forth in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedure.169

NCAA Enforcement Procedure section 7-(d)-(1) also would reach coaches
and provides that the following penalty might apply:
The prohibition of ome or all 'outside' competitions in the sport involved
in the latest major violation for one or two sports seasons and the
prohibition of all coaching staff members in that sport from involvement
directly or indirectly in any coaching activities at the institution during
a two-year period.'7The latter provision prohibiting coaching activities puzzled Chancellor
Young who noted that he read it to mean:
that the coaching staff would be prohibited from coaching for the full
two year period even if the penalty in terms of outside competition was
only part of a season, which would mean that if that is correct, that
you would be able to participate but7 you could not have the coaching
staff that you have hired to do that. '
72
Secretary-Treasurer Bailey agreed that such an interpretation was plausible,

and asked Steve Morgan, legal counsel, to respond. Morgan noted that he
thought:
the intent [was] to mean not through the entire period, but to coordinate
the assessment against the number of games or seasons that the institution
would not be able to compete-to coordinate that with the period of
time that the coaching staff would not be able to coach. The Committee
would have the flexibility to make the coaching staff restrictions consistent with the game restrictions. 73

Questions also were raised as to whether or not the provisions regarding
coaches were to apply in such a manner as to restrict a coach's faculty status
at a campus granting such status. Bailey responded that it was only meant
to apply where the coach had contractual, as opposed to faculty, status with
174
an institution.
Another issue related to Proposal No. 3 that sparked significant discussion
was the due process concern. Donna A. Lopiano of the University of Texas
spoke on behalf of the sponsors (the Southwest Conference) of Proposal 3-

3, stating that "a resolution that calls for development of due-process leg-

169. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at app. 3.
170. Id. at app. 7.
171. Id. at 47.
172. Id.
173. Id. At the suggestion of Chancellor Young, that interpretation was entered as part of
the record. Id.See also id.at 69.
174. Id.at 45-46.
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islation be considered [at] the 1986 Convention. ' ' 171 Lopiano argued, on
behalf of the proposed resolution, that the NCAA was "obligated to refine
existing investigatory and due-process mechanisms to protect those who want
to be able to prevent major violations and wish to be immediately informed
when staff members or other institutional representatives appear to be acting
contrary to NCAA rules and regulations,"'176 and that:
it is too late for integrity, it is too late for accountability, it is too late
for the chief executive officer to control athletics when we do not immediately inform an institution of a potential violation and do not allow
that institution to clean its own house in a timely and constructive
fashion.'7
Chancellor Heyman countered on behalf of the Presidents Commission.
He emphasized that they are "very sympathetic to the concerns that are

175. Id. at 69. The resolution provided that:
Whereas, the ultimate objective of N.C.A.A. rules is to maintain integrity and
fairness in intercollegiate athletics competition; and
Whereas, the Association is considering amendments which increase the range
and severity of penalties levied for violations of N.C.A.A. rules; and
Whereas, the prospect of such a penalty system has increased member institutions' concern for fairness and due process in investigation and enforcement
procedures;
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that the Council shall prepare legislation for
submission to the 1986 N.C.A.A. Convention which will provide for inclusion of
the following as requirements under the "Official Procedures Governing the
N.C.A.A. Enforcement Program," and which will encourage communication among
the administrative staff and member institutions.
Be It FurtherResolved, that it shall be the responsibility of member institutions
to inform prospective student-athletes in writing, upon commencement of recruiting each of those student-athletes, of the specific penalties that may be imposed
on them for violations of N.C.A.A. rules and regulations.
Be It Further Resolved, that the N.C.A.A. shall send immediately, to the
principal athletics administrator(s) and/or chief executive officer of each member
institution, copies of all documents of inquiry or allegations relating to possible
violations of N.C.A.A. rules and regulations received by the N.C.A.A. pertaining
to their institution.
Be It FurtherResolved, that every inquiry or allegation that relates to possible
violations by a member institution shall be submitted in writing and shall be
investigated promptly. The institution shall be notified that the investigation is
underway. Decisions to commence inquiries or investigations shall not be based
on any theory of accumulation. [Note: This shall not preclude the imposition of
penalties based on cumulative violations.]
Be It FurtherResolved, that the chief executive officer of each member institution shall be given a copy of all investigative reports and other documents
prepared with reference to that institution.
Be It Finally Resolved, that any member institution which submits a request
for inquiry or alleges a violation on the part of another member institution, shall
be informed of the resolution of that inquiry/investigation within 12 months of
the submission of such inquiry/allegation.
Id. at app. 9.
176. Id. at 69.
177. Id. at 69-70.
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evidenced by [the] proposal" and that they recognize that, "the procedures
that attend enforcement processes of the Association meet legal and moral
responsibilities with respect to those people in those institutions who are
accused," but he added that it was "premature" to instruct the Council "to
prepare legislation that embodies those principles that are stated in this
[resolution].' 7 Chancellor Heyman further indicated that he felt it was
premature because some of the ideas set forth in the resolution, "should be
thought through further before the legislation is drafted for the consideration
of this body."' 79 Chancellor Heyman offered two illustrations to support
this position. First, he noted that the resolution's directive to force the
NCAA to "send immediately to the principal athletics administrators and
the chief executive officer of each institution copies of all documents of
inquiry or related allegations" might be a good idea but it needed further
thought before legislation was drafted. Second, Chancellor Heyman felt the
reference to delivering "all investigative reports" might be too broad. 80
Finally, in an effort to placate concerns over the due process issue, Chancellor
Heyman moved that the resolution be referred to the Presidents Commission
and the Council with the assurance that attention will be given, "to these
due process problems in the very near future for consideration probably at
the January Convention.''8 While Heyman's remarks satisfied most members, 8 2 and the motion to refer Proposal 3-3 was adopted, 83 it did not satisfy
Lopiano, who continued to assert her belief that, "it is important that we
84
not leave here without making a due-process statement.'
Having successfully deflected the due process argument by referring the
matter to the Council and the Commission, and having mustered over-

178. Id. at 70.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., statements supporting the motion to refer made by Russell J. Poel, id.; Asa
N. Green, id. at 71; and Tom Farer, id. Of particular interest were Poel's comments to the
effect that,
Although some of the suggestions in this resolution are of value, there are others,
particularly those that talk about immediate disclosure of all data, that would
impair and seriously damage the effectiveness of the enforcement program....
[T]he Council is concerned that the Convention might direct the Council to prepare
amendments that itbelieves in some instances would gravely weaken the effort
to reduce cheating and violations in college athletics.
Id. at 70-71.
183. Id. at app. 10.
184. Id. at 70. Frank E. Vandiver of Texas A & M University also opposed referral of the
resolution. Vandiver felt that the disclosure called for in the resolution would be part of "a
healthy process to let [members] know what is going on and possibly [would constitute] a
chance to give [institutions] a shot at in-house cleaning up." Id. at 71. Vandiver added that
he did not feel the resolution had the effect of directing the Council to draft legislation based
on its specific provisions.

1987]

NCAA DEATH PENALTY

whelming support for Proposal No. 3, the Convention turned to Proposal
4. The express intent behind that Proposal was:
[t]o require that restrictions imposed upon an institution's coaching staff
member by the Committee on Infractions or as a result of the showcause provision of the enforcement procedures be applied to the coach
even if he or she is employed by an institution other than the one at
which the violations occurred.'
This legislation, which elicited no discussion in the Business Meeting, was
passed by a total vote of 431-1.116
The Convention next considered Proposal No. 5, a resolution regarding
the eligibility of student-athletes. 8 7 That proposal would have held student-

185. Id. at app. 10. As such, Proposal 4 would amend NCAA Bylaw 5-6-(d)-(3) by deleting
its present language and substituting the following:
(3) At the time of such certification, no current member of its coaching staff
has been within the past two years:
(i) Temporarily or permanently suspended from coaching duties by another
member institution; or
(ii) Prohibited as a result of violations occurring while employed by another
member institution from participating in certain identified coaching-related activities, unless the prohibition has been equally applied by the certifying institution
with respect to the individual's coaching-related activities on behalf of it; or
(iii) Permitted to perform any coaching-related activities for the certifying
institution that were prohibited after determination by the Committee on Infractions of an "appropriate disciplinary action" for the individual in accordance
with the show-cause provision of Section 7-(b)-(12) of the NCAA enforcement
procedure, as a result of involvement in a violation of the Association's legislation
as determined by the Committee on Infractions or the Council, provided the
period of suspension or prohibition is in effect and provided the coaching staff
member has been given through the appropriate institution notice of an opportunity to be heard at both the NCAA hearing resulting in the finding of involvement in the violation and the institutional hearing resulting in suspension or
prohibition.
Id. at A-10.
It would also amend NCAA Enforcement Procedure § 7-(b)-(12) to provide as follows:
"Requirement that a member institution that has been found in violation, or that has an
athletics department staff member who has been found in violation of the provisions of the
NCAA legislation while representing another institution, show cause. .. ." Id. at A-10 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 72, A-10.
187. As proposed, the resolution stated that:
Whereas, concern has been expressed that prospective and enrolled studentathletes who are involved in serious violations of NCAA rules and regulations
should be held accountable and should remain ineligible for intercollegiate athletics
competition; and
Whereas, although institutional staff members and representatives of athletics
interests have the greatest responsibility to ensure that violations do not occur
and experience indicates that staff members and representatives are the primary
impetus for violations of NCAA regulations, prospective and enrolled studentathletes are not without blame in the violations; and
Whereas, it is the present policy of the NCAA Eligibility Committee and
N.C.A.A. Council not to restore the eligibility of an improperly recruited student-
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athletes involved in serious violation of NCAA rules and regulations blameworthy and "accountable," such that they "should remain ineligible for
intercollegiate athletics competition." Prior to its consideration, Charles L.
Sewall of Robert Morris College moved for the adoption of Proposal No.
5-1.181 In behalf of his amendment, Sewall argued that:
Resolution 5 would broaden the responsibilities of students with compliance. Certainly, we support this philosophy generally and we think
that the Council and the Presidents Commission ought to be commended
for their solid and encouraging work.
However, there does appear to be a significant omission in Proposal
No. 5.... [W]ith the amendment to 3-3, Paragraph 5, it has answered
some of our objectives, namely that this information is now made available or suggested to be made available to the recruit upon his acceptance.
Our amendment addresses another need.
[W]e propose that the Council be directed to prepare a summary of
NCAA rules and regulations that all members would be required to
distribute to their recruits and student-athletes and that each varsity team
would be required to meet as a group at least once each season to review
the summary. We think this apparatus would be helpful for two reasons.
First, as I have mentioned, it would help familiarize student-athletes who
want what is expected or required of them.
Speaking for myself, I think also it applies to the presidents ....
As
educators, it is our duty to educate them in this area among others.
Secondly, this educational process should preempt any argument that
we have acted-unfairly to students misled by others. If we provide our
students with the informational tools they need, most of the observers

athlete who attends the institution involved in the violation if the committee
concludes that the violation resulted in a recruiting advantage for the involved
institution or a substantial material benefit to the prospect;
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that the Eligibility Committee restore the

eligibility of student-athletes involved in violations only when circumstances clearly
warrant restoration; that the NCAA Council be directed to develop legislation
for consideration at the 1986 Convention to ensure that student-athletes are held

accountable, for serious violations, of NCAA rules and regulations in which they
knowingly participate, and that the proposed legislation be available for review
by the Presidents Commission in its October 1985 meeting.

Id. at A-10-11.
188. Sewall's proposal would have amended the fourth paragraph to provide as follows:
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that the Eligibility Committee restore the
eligibility of student-athletes involved in violations only when circumstances clearly
warrant restoration; that the NCAA Council be directed to develop legislation
for consideration at the 1986 Convention to ensure that student-athletes are held
accountable for serious violations of NCAA rules and regulations .in which they
knowingly participate; that such legislation include provisions for mandatory
distributionto all recruitsand student-athletes of a summary of applicable NCAA
rules and regulations, such summary to be developed by the Council, and for
mandatory review of the summary by each varsity team meeting as a group at
least once in each season, and that the proposed legislation and summary be
available for review by the Presidents Commission in its October 1985 meeting.
Id. at A-11-12 (emphasis in Sewall's amendment).

NCAA DEATH PENALTY

1987]

1023

likely will agree that we have acted responsibly and without failure of
sanctions, whatever sanctions may be imposed.
[W]e believe that educating our students to our rules and regulations
each and every year is an important area that must be addressed ....
Ignorance of rules may be no defense for cheaters, but if we permit our
student-athletes to remain ignorant, our conduct must be just as indefensible. 19

Sewall's amendment was defeated, without debate, by a 202-205 margin. 90
In opposing the amendment, the Commission again evidenced some insensitivity to the due process and related rights of student athletes. 191
Having defeated Sewall's amendment, the Convention adopted, by a vote
of 436 to 0, and without further discussion, the resolution contained in
Proposal 5. In supporting the Resolution, President Singletary declared that

it affirms that:
member institutions expect student-athletes to be held responsible for
their actions. It directs the Eligibility Committee to restore studentathletes' eligibility only when circumstances clearly warrant restoration
....
[and] directs the [Council] to develop legislation for consideration
at the 1986 Convention to ensure that student-athletes are held accountable for serious violations of NCAA rules and regulations .... 192

The Convention then turned to Proposal No. 6 dealing with the principle
of institutional control and responsibility. This proposal was intended to
"require that a member institution's annual intercollegiate athletics budget

shall be controlled by the institution and subject to its normal budgeting
procedures and that it be approved by the institution's chief executive officer
or his or her designee."' 193 This amendment was approved by a vote of 438-

1,' 94 and the Convention next considered Proposal No. 7.
Proposal No. 7 was intended to "require an annual audit of all expenditures for an institution's intercollegiate athletics program by an individual
from outside the institution selected by the institution's chief executive officer

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
adding

Id. at 72.
The vote was 202 for and 205 against. Id. at A-12.
See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 73.
Id. at A-12. The proposal would amend art. 3, § 2 of the NCAA Constitution by
paragraph (b), which would provide as follows:
(b) An institution's annual budget for its intercollegiate athletics programs shall
be controlled by the institution and subject to its normal budgeting procedures.
The institution's chief executive officer or an institutional administrator from
outside the athletics department designated by the chief executive officer shall
approve the annual budget in the event that the institution's normal budgeting
procedures do not require such action.
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at A-12.
194. Id. at 73.
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Some discussion ensued, and concern was voiced

over a few points. There was a question as to whether booster groups would

have to submit their entire budgets to an audit. This concern was mitigated
when it was pointed out by John B. Slaughter of the University of Maryland,

the presenter on behalf of the Commission, that only athletic expenditures

would be covered. 96 There were also some logistical concerns, particularly
among public universities with established external audit procedures, as to
whether this legislation would require a separate or additional external audit.
President Davis responded by stressing that the language only requires a

"qualified auditor who is not a staff member."'

97

After these and related

minor concerns were addressed, Proposal No. 7 was adopted by a vote of
422-14. 91Proposal No. 7, together with Proposal 6, serve as further evidence

of the intent of the Presidents Commission to gain control over their respective athletic budgets and to begin to exercise control over booster groups.
The next resolution, Proposal No. 8, dealt with the presidents' desire to
limit the number of athletic contests generally, and to limit specifically the

number of basketball games an institution may play each year that do not
count toward the limitations in that sport. 99 This resolution was approved

195. Id. at A-12. The proposal would also amend art. 3, § 2 of the NCAA Constitution
and would provide that:
(c) All expenditures for or in behalf of an institution's intercollegiate athletics
programs, including those by any outside organization, agency or group of individuals (two or more), shall be subject to an annual financial audit conducted
for the institution by a qualified auditor who is not a staff member of the
institution and who is selected either by the institution's chief executive officer
or by an institutional administrator from outside the athletics department designated by the chief executive officer (in addition to any regular financial audit
policies and procedures of the institution). The audit report shall be presented to
the chief executive officer.
196. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 74.
197. Id. at 75.

198. Id.
199. As adopted, Proposal No. 8 provides that:
Whereas, the proliferation of contests and competitive dates in various sports
contributes significantly to the spiraling costs of conducting intercollegiate athletics
programs; and
Whereas, restrictions on the number of contests or dates of competition in each
sport are necessary to preserve an adequate period of time for participating studentathletes to meet academic commitments and requirements; and
Whereas, member institutions have adopted legislation to exempt certain basketball competition from counting toward the permissible number of contests;
and
Whereas, at the 1985 NCAA Convention, the members of Division I and
Division IIadopted limitations on the number of competitive opportunities inall
sports;
Now,Therefore, Be ItResolved, that this Association does not favor an increase
inthe permissible number of regular-season intercollegiate contests or dates of
competition inany sports, including football or basketball; and
Be ItFurther Resolved, that the NCAA Council be directed to develop legislation
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by a vote of 429-3 and expressed concern over "the spiraling costs of
conducting intercollegiate ... programs" and the time expended by studentathletes on athletics, depriving them of adequate time to meet their academic
2
responsibilities. 00
The Convention next considered Proposal No. 9, which was presented by
the Council, 2°' and was based upon the results of the Presidents Commission's
survey. That survey indicated a strong desire on the part of the presidents
to maintain "the Association's current financial aid and related amateurism
rules ... ."202 In furtherance of these ends, the resolution resolved that:
prior to the beginning of the 1985-86 academic year or shortly thereafter,
through direction of their chief executive officers, [member institutions]
shall administer affidavits to all varsity and recruited new student-athletes, the form and content of the affidavit to be prescribed by the
NCAA Council and to include specific questions and require specific
information concerning financial assistance and athletically related benefits currently being received or to be received by said student-athletes
203

The one-time use of this resolution was but another indication of the commitment of the Convention to ensure academic integrity in intercollegiate
athletics. It also foreshadowed the cost-containment concerns that were to
become significant in the next concerted legislative effort by the Presidents
Commission in 1987. At that meeting, the Commission called for another
special Convention to deal with economic issues. 2°4 The remaining proposals,
Nos. 10-12, dealt with administrative matters and are insignificant for the
purpose of this Article.
As the preceeding examination illustrates, the Presidents Commission wanted
to go on record as having taken a dramatic first step toward gaining a
measure of control over their athletic programs and restoring a sense of
academic integrity to those programs. Much that transpired was salutary,
at least for those who desire a reassertion of academic responsibility in
intercollegiate athletics. Questions, nevertheless, linger as to whether the
presidents can maintain a high level of continuing control over academic
integrity and related issues in intercollegiate athletics, and as to whether the

for consideration at the 1986 Convention to permit a member institution's intercollegiate basketball team to participate in any one year in no more than one of
the opportunities, including a foreign tour, for competition that do not count
toward the maximum number of contests.
Id. at A-13.
200. Id. at 75-76.
201. The prior Proposals, Nos. 1-8, were initiated by the Presidents Commission. Proposals
No. 9 and 10-12 all originated with the Council.
202. CoNvaEroNn
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at A-13.
203. Id. at A-14.
204. See, e.g., Lederman & Farrell, Mood of Reform DominatesNCAA Meeting; Presidents'
Group Sets a 'Whole New Agenda, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 21, 1987, at 33-35.
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course charted in the summer of 1985 was in some measure misdirected.
The remainder of this Article primarily examines the latter issue, particularly
as it applies to presidents and their institutions, coaches and athletic administrators, and finally the student-athletes themselves. The Article concludes with some observations regarding the future of the reform movement
initiated by the Presidents Commission in the summer of 1985.
III.

How THE PRESIDENTS PUNISH THEMSELVES AND OTHERS: AN
EVALUATION

A.

The Presidents Punish Themselves

In this portion of the Article, I first will look at how the presidents
punished themselves as chief executive officers and then I will turn to an
examination of how they punished their institutions, thereby indirectly punishing themselves. In engaging in this analysis, I will address both practical
and theoretical problems and possibilities.
1.

How the Presidents Commission Punished Chief
Executive Officers

At first blush, it would appear that the presidents engaged in a bit of
self-preservation by refraining from punishing themselves directly in adopting
the "death penalty" legislation. For example, while the presidents proposed
and the Special Convention passed legislation designed to punish institutional
staff, 2 5 coaches2°6 and student-athletes 2 7 directly, the presidents never expressly mentioned themselves while designing the punishment scheme adopted
at the special Convention. There are, however, two provisions that might
be construed to apply to the presidents individually, at least under certain
circumstances.
In setting a minimum penalty for a major violation, NCAA Enforcement
Procedure section 7-(c)-(4) provides that except in unique cases, the penalty
shall require "that all institutional staff members determined by the Committee on Infractions knowingly to have engaged in or condoned a major

205. See, e.g., Proposal No. 3, supra text accompanying note 136, severely punishing all
"institutional staff members" who "knowingly ...engaged in or condoned a major violation."
See also id. at § 7-(d)-(3).
206. See, e.g., Proposal No. 4, supra note 185, at 5-6(d)-(2) and NCAA Enforcement

Procedure supra text accompanying note 136, at § 7-(c)-(3), expressly punishing coaches.
Additionally, the reference to personnel in NCAA Enforcement Procedure, §§ 7-(c)-(4) and 7(d)-(3) discussed in the preceding footnote also presumably refers to coaches.
207. See, e.g., Proposal No. 5, supra text accompanying note 185, dealing with the eligibility
of student-athletes. See also CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at A-11-2.
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violation be subject either to termination of employment, to suspension
without pay... or to reassignment of duties within the institution ....-208
While the term "institutional staff" conceivably might not be interpreted to
include presidents who have knowledge of or condone major violations, the
NCAA apparently may take the position that it refers to all those connected
with the university or college, including chief executive officers. 2°9 Indeed,
with adoption of proposals requiring academic reporting, 210 institutional selfstudy, 21' institutional control over the budget process 212 and an independent
audit of all expenditures related to an institution's intercollegiate athletic
program,2 1 it is evident that the chief executive officer generally should be
in a position to have at least constructive knowledge of potential pr6blems
in the institution's athletic program. Additionally, it is certainly conceivable
that a chief executive officer may possess actual knowledge of violations.
With access to this information or knowledge, the chief executive might be
held accountable in some measure for excesses in the athletics program that
ultimately lead to violations of the NCAA rules. This conclusion is further
buttressed by the increasingly active role the presidents are taking in controlling their athletic programs and by the fact that Official Inquiries have,
as a matter of past practice, expressly named the president. 21 4 In exercising

208. NCAA Enforcement Procedure, supra text accompanying note 136, at § 7-(c)-(4) (emphasis added). See also NCAA Enforcement Procedure, supra text accompanying note 137, at
§ 7-(d)-(3).
209. Telephone conversation with Charles E. Smrt, Assistant Director of Enforcement of
the NCAA (March 19, 1987).
210. Proposal No. 2, as adopted, amended Bylaw, see supra note 127, at 5-6-(e) and applied
only to Division I institutions. Under this provision the chief executive officer is required to
accumulate and provide annual information regarding entrance requirements, academic status
of current students athletes, graduation rates and programs of study. With such information
the chief executive officer might well gain actual or constructive knowledge of certain improprieties.
211. Proposal No. 1, amending art. 4, § 2(b) of the NCAA Constitution, see supra note
121 requires each institution to conduct a comprehensive self-study of its athletic program,
examining the institutional purpose and athletic philosophy, the authority of the chief executive
in personnel and financial affairs, athletics organization and administration, etc. Access to such
information might be deemed to give a chief executive officer constructive, or perhaps even
actual, knowledge of a problem in her athletic program.
212. Proposal No. 6, amending art. 3, § 2(b) of the NCAA Constitution, see supra note
193, provides in pertinent part that "[a]n institution's budget for its intercollegiate athletics
programs shall be controlled by the institution and subject to its normal budgeting procedures,"
and further supports the notion that the chief executive officer should have at least constructive
knowledge of potential problems.
213. Proposal No. 7, amending art. 3, § 2(c) of the NCAA Constitution, see supra note
195, would give the chief executive officer access to information related to other potential
problem areas (e.g., audits of booster organizations).
214. In the words of Charles Alan Wright, former Chair of the Committee on Infractions:
If the president feels somewhat queasy after reading the substantive part of the
official inquiry, he will not be helped by the final series of questions and allegations, which provide a blazing coda to the document .... They will almost

always include allegations in which the president himself is named. Since 1974,
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their legislative prerogative at the special Convention, the presidents arguably
subjected themselves to the punishment scheme if they are found to be
individually culpable. Given recent revelations by Texas Governor Clements
that as a member of the Board of Governors at Southern Methodist University he and other board members approved illicit payments to SMU
football players, it is arguable that there might be instances when members
of the Board of Governors or Trustees should also be punished, at least to
the extent that their involvement in matters related to the athletic department
should be curtailed. 2 5 It would not be unthinkable to begin to demand at
least a modicum of individual responsibility on the part of chief executives
and perhaps even members of the Board of Trustees. But, as previously
noted, it may be necessary either to interpret broadly existing language in
the punishment scheme adopted in the summer of 1985 or adopt an explicit
provision holding such parties accountable in the future. Such a move would
have the beneficial effect of encouraging chief executives to continue to take
an ongoing active role in governance of intercollegiate athletics at their
respective institutions and at the national level rather than merely reacting
periodically as crisis managers.
There are at least two other senses in which a chief executive officer could
be punished for knowingly condoning violations in her institution's athletic
department. First, the chief executive might be punished by the conference
or the institution in its effort to cooperate with the NCAA and thereby
lessen the institutional penalty imposed by the NCAA. Second, the chief
executive, and other responsible individuals, could be sued personally by
aggrieved parties for their involvement in such violations as illustrated by
the numerous threats of law suits arising out of the recent debacle at Southern
21 6
Methodist University.

NCAA bylaws have required the chief executive officer of each member institution
to certify that the institution is complying with NCAA rules insofar as he can
determine.
Wright, Responding to an NCAA Investigation, Or, What to Do When an Official Inquiry
Comes, 1 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 19, 21 (1984).
215. See Thomas, SMU Governors Allowed Illicit Athlete Pay, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1987,
at Al, col. 3. Specifically, Governor Clements is quoted as having said that:
We-with a capital we-made a considered judgment over several months that
commitments had been made and in the interest of the institution, the boys, their
families and to comply with the NCAA, that the program would be phased out
and that we would comply in a full sense of integrity to all the rules and regulations.
Id. at Al, col. 4. SMU administrators issued a statement stressing that they "deplored" the
making of illegal payments to student-athletes and called on board members who participated
to resign. Id. at Al, col. 5. Students and others also considered bringing a lawsuit against the
Board and other responsible parties.
216. See, e.g., Texas Governor Admits Role in SMU Scandal, Sporting News, Mar. 16, 1987,
at 49, col. 1, pointing out that "the SMU Student Senate. . . voted, 19-5, to authorize student
body president Trevor Pearlman to discuss the possibility of a lawsuit against all responsible
parties for injuries incurred upon the student body due to the handling of the football situation
by SMU leaders"; S.M.U.'s Board Considers Suit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1987, at B12, col.
6.
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It is likely that a push toward making presidents individually responsible
would be resisted by some athletic administrators who would feel that such
a move would have the effect of causing the presidents to be unduly intrusive
as to the internal management and operation of their athletic programs and
by some presidents who would resist penalizing themselves individually,
particularly since they indirectly are being punished in a rather severe fashion
for excesses and violations in their athletic programs. These presidents would
argue, for example, that the penalties prescribed for major and for repeat
violations are so severe that the whole institution, together with the president,
217
suffers whenever a major penalty in invoked.

2.

How the Presidents Commission Punished Their Institutions

Whatever may be done in the future in terms of holding the presidents
individually responsible, the real pressure will continue to be indirect-as
the institution is penalized, so is its chief executive officer who will be
deemed responsible by powerful internal and external groups other than, or
in addition to, the NCAA. Indeed, it would appear that the presidents have
created a system that ultimately will punish themselves; given their increased
involvement in controlling the excesses of their athletic programs, they will
be held personally responsible by their constituencies-by state legislatures,

boards of trustees, alumni, faculties and students-for violations that bring
infamy or economic malaise to their institutions. As such, having assumed
renewed responsibility for oversight of intercollegiate athletics, the presidents
have set a course that may mandate, as a matter of personal prudence,

217. It is reported, for example, that in a normal season SMU's football program would
show a profit of $1.2 million. The 1985 probation resulted in an initial profit cut of $700,000.
Additional penalties imposed will further slash expected receipts (e.g., SMU reportedly earns
$500,000 per home game, a portion of which is shared with the opponent, but in invoking the
"death penalty," the Committee on Infractions eliminated all home games during 1988).
Goodwin, Action on SMU is Swift and Decisive, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987 at D21, col. 5.
Referring to even a one year suspension, like that received by Southern Methodist, Barry
Switzer, football coach at the University of Oklahoma, argued that:
[The NCAA] will kill a program if they suspend it for a year or two.... And
if the football program dies, most of the other sports in that department are
going to die, too, because it's football that pays for it. This thing is so farreaching, it will affect everybody from the groundskeeper to the local banker.
The groundskeeper will probably lose his job because there won't be any money
to pay him. And people in the financial community are probably going to sue
because they are involved with the university in bond issues or expansion of the
facilities and who's going to pay for all that if the program is suspended?
Tucker, NCAA Death Penalty, Associated Press, June 29, 1985. Certainly this will damage the
institution economically and will, therefore, indirectly penalize its president. Dr. James Zumberge, President of the University of Southern California, and former President at SMU,
indicated that even an NCAA-imposed ban upon football television for a first major offense
(a penalty far less severe than the "death penalty" for repeat violators) would cost USC several
million dollars. See Koch, supra note 6, at 18.
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continuing involvement in the operation of their respective athletic programs.
This will be particularly true if the presidents resist the self-preservationist
urge to dismantle the system of presidential responsibility they have created.
The stringency of the penalties adopted at the special Convention of June,
1985, thus may have surprised some industry observers.2 1 1 It will, therefore,
be helpful to examine the manner in which the presidents punished their
own program and institutions.
3.

How the Presidents Commission Punished Their Programs

In an era when fixed or mandatory sentences represent the current vogue
in criminal law,2 1 9 the Presidents Commission followed suit with its own
version of harsh, essentially fixed sentences. In amending NCAA Enforcement Procedure section 7(c), and setting forth minimum applicable penalties
for major violations, the Presidents Commission delineated a series of rather
specific, fixed penalties.22 0 This, no doubt, was done in an effort to minimize
discretion. Too much discretion in sentencing has been the bane against
221
which many proponents of fixed sentencing have fought.
It is also recognized, however, that justice can often be achieved only
when there is sufficient discretion to treat genuinely unique cases differently.
The Presidents Commission thus responded to the tension between fairness
in the individual case and the certainty and uniformity of a clear and fixed
rule of law by providing for some discretion. Indeed, while on first reading
the penalties provided in Proposal No. 3 seem to be fixed and quite severe,
fine distinction appear on a closer examination. For example, while the seven
prescribed penalties in NCAA Enforcement Procedure sections 7-(d)-(1) to(7) are fairly tight and offer little room for manipulation, there are two
issues that must be decided before those provisions are triggered: (1) a
"major" violation(s) must be found to have occurred; and (2) the Committee
on Infractions must decline to classify the case before it as "unique," and
deserving of being excepted from the stringency (or perhaps in rare and very
extreme cases, comparative leniency) of the seven mandated penalties in that
section. 222 It will be recalled that there was extensive debate at and before

218. It will be recalled thatthe President's Commission strengthened rather than weakened
the penalties initially proposed by staff in the first draft of the legislation. See supra notes 9799, 103 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Frankel & Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEo. L.J. 225
(1984).
220. See, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRMNAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973); Hirsch,
Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REv. 6, 12 (1983).
222. It also should be noted that Enforcement Procedure § 7(d)(1) provides, in the case of
repeat violators, for the "prohibition of some or all 'outside' competition in the sports involved
in the latest major violation for one or two sports seasons :..."
(emphasis added). This
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the special Convention over the issue of defining a violation as "major" or
"secondary" and that it generally was concluded that resolution of these
issues would have to await the case-by-case, and necessarily discretionary,

development of a "common law." 2 3 Such case-by-case development ultimately would clarify the meaning of the terms "major" and "secondary. ' 224
It is certain that every case is in some sense "unique," and it will be
interesting to observe how the Committee on Infractions will choose to

define and implement this term. If the Committee chooses to construe it
broadly, they could give themselves much discretion, so much in fact that

the mandatory appearance of the penalties would be little more than a facade.
In this regard, it should be noted that NCAA Enforcement Procedure section
7(d) also provides that the Committee on Infractions may except "unique
cases on the basis of specifically stated reasons" and, therefore, offers a
similar source of discretion. In the case of both section 7-(c) and section
7-(d), the Committee, nevertheless, must specify its reasons for finding a
given case to be "unique." It often has been asserted that a way of limiting
discretion over time is to require written reasons for a sentence imposed.M
This would be equally true with regard to deciding whether cases are "unique"

and would serve to interject a sense of certainty back into an otherwise
amorphous provision over time. Providing an actual sentencing hearing or
a system whereby more input could be given at the sentencing stage by those
who will be punished would also be very helpful in terms of assuming fairness
in imposing penalties. 6
Another somewhat related concern that occasionally was raised during the
special Convention was the due process issue.227 Institutions have long asserted that both as a matter of excessive regulatory discretion-the extensive
discretion placed in the NCAA staff-and as a matter of process-in terms

provision, therefore, also provides discretion to the Committee on Infractions after the finding
of a repeat, major violation. In fact, the Committee on Infractions exercised that discretion
in the SMU case by suspending competition for a single year and by limiting competition in
the following season to seven games (none of which would be at home). Even given that
exercise of discretion, however, the Committee on Infractions action was said to be "swift
[and] decisive." See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 217, at D24, col. 5.
223. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
225. Written reasons develop a more solid and somewhat less discretionary body of common
law over time. It therefore would appear that the Commission was again seeking to balance
uniformity and discretion in this punitive scheme.
226. I discuss this point at greater depth with regard to the sentencing process as applied to
the student-athlete who is held culpable. See infra notes 303-05 and accompanying text. The
points made regarding coaches, administrators and student-athletes might apply as well to the
Presidents and other officials. It is clear, however, that, as a matter of degree, the Presidents
and other officials are in position to command less solicitude in this regard than studentathletes, because the student-athletes are underrepresented in this system while the Presidents
are able to exert substantial power both at the legislative action stage and at the NCAA
investigative and enforcement stages in a specific proceeding.
227. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
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of the ability to be heard and to have notice-institutions have been deprived
of due process in the NCAA enforcement procedure. For instance, although
the NCAA has asserted that its enforcement process is built upon the principles of "cooperation" and "disclosure," it often has been argued by
detractors of the NCAA that cooperation and disclosure have tended to run
2
on a one-way street from the institutions to the NCAA but not back again. 2
Similar arguments were raised at the special Convention by the Southwest
Conference in support of Resolution 3-3, which ultimately was referred to
the Council and the Presidents Commission. 229 These efforts to force more
disclosure on the part of the NCAA- were criticized as being premature, as
well as being criticized on the ground that such disclosure would hinder
enforcement efforts and would also import into the current enforcement
process, "the burdensome complexities of the criminal law that almost inevitably [interfere with enforcement] .... -210 Given the severity of the penal
provisions adopted at the special Convention and the high cost attendant
with the imposition of those penalties, it is likely that due process objections
will increase. There are, however, two senses in which they may be ameliorated: (1) the January, 1987 Convention recently acted to liberalize disclosure
and related rules, giving the institutions access to more information earlier
in the proceedings; 23I and (2) the presidents and the institutions themselves
are well represented in the NCAA legislative process and can change rules
they consider unfair. 2 2 Indeed, th" Presidents Commission expressed some
concern regarding institutional due process in the NCAA enforcement procedure. The Presidents Commission felt, however, that it was necessary at
that time to act quickly to allay fears that intercollegiate athletic programs
lacked academic integrity by going on record as being committed to eliminating cheating in intercollegiate athletics.
In this rush to act decisively, 233 the Presidents Commission regrettably
neglected to discuss the academic or theoretical implications of their actions.

228. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 56.
229. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
230. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 71 (summary of statement of Tom Farer
of the University of New Mexico).
231. See Rules Charges Passed at the NCAA Convention, Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 21,
1987, at 35. The NCAA does appear inclined to try to balance the cost of disclosure with the
added that even more changes in the investigative process could be forthcoming. Boosters
Barredfrom Recruiting; Coaches' Income to be Watched, Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 21,
1987, at 35. The NCAA does appear inclined to try to balance the cost of disclosure, with the
serious need to disclose as much information as possible to the institution in the interests of
due process and cooperation.
232. Some commentators disagree with this point. See, e.g., Gaona, supra note 40. There
is a sense, however, particularly with the strengthening of the hand of the Presidents Commission
in the NCAA's legislative process, that the institutions are in a position to do much to assure
that their rights to due process are protected.
233. The President's Commission acted with dispatch to initiate the legislative process. This
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Just as they failed to consider the interplay between the rule of law and
discretion in developing their punishment system, the Presidents Commission
also failed to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of sentencing and punishment. The Presidents Commission never, for example, fully clarified the
purpose(s) of their punishment system other than to say it was to restore integrity."" President Ryan, however, did note that the "Presidents are heart sick
about the serious violations of rules that are occurring by coaches, alumni and
booster clubs and are determined to stop them." 2 35 This statement and others
like it implies that the primary purpose of the punishment system was to deter
future cheating and perhaps even rehabilitate cheaters-although there were
also statements which implied that the purpose was retributive, to inflict some
23 6
suffering on wrongdoers.
Thus, while there were some very basic discussions regarding the theoretical
purposes or underpinnings of the legislation by the presidents, this discussion
was superficial and lacked coherence. The discussion as to purposes was
confused or potentially inconsistent because the presidents attributed at least
two differing purposes for the legislation: (1) deterrence of future crime;
and (2) retribution. One author has differentiated these theories by referring
to them as consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 237 and has noted that
'23
there ought to be a third theory, the "moral good theory of punishment. 1
Professor Lipkin describes this third possible theory by stating that:
[t]he moral good theory of punishment is intriguing because it promises
to explain and justify punishment by showing how punishment restores
the moral identity of the offender. Rather than focusing on socially
desirable benefits or abstract notions of justice, the moral good theory

served as an indication of their resolve to do something about perceived excesses in intercollegiate
athletics. Indeed, within a little over a month after completion of the survey they were discussing
actual legislative proposals, and within four months they were adopting somewhat refined
versions of those proposals.
234. See, e.g., supra notes 10, 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
235. CONiVENnrON

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 122, at 61.

236. Frankel notes that there are "two ultimate purposes to be served by criminal punishment:
the deserved infliction of suffering on evildoers and the prevention of crime." M. FRANKEL,
supra note 221, at 36. There was much talk of deterrence during the special Convention, but
statements also were made implying that retribution was an intended purpose of the legislation.
On one occasion, for example, when the special Convention was discussing punishment of
student-athletes, President Singletary noted that they were seeking to "affirm that member
institutions expect student-athletes to be held responsible for their actions.... [S]tudent-athletes
are [to be] held accountable for serious violations of NCAA rules and regulations." CoNvENTnoN
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 73. Similarly, discussion ensued regarding inflicting punishment
on coaches. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
237. See R. Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment 1-2, (unpublished manuscript
available in Delaware Law School Library of Widener University.) Professor Lipkin notes that,
"Generations of scholars have divided theories of punishment into two categories. Theories of
the first type explain and justify punishment by appealing to the socially desirable consequences
of punishing wrongdoers. Theories of the second type explain and justify punishment, not in
terms of its consequences, but rather because justice demands punishing the guilty." Id. at 1.
238. Id.
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grounds punishment in something fundamental to the offender: his identity as an autonomous, responsible moral agent.239
Whether one believes there are two primary theories of punishment, as does
Judge Frankel, or three, as does Professor Lipkin, it is clear that the
Presidents Commission's treatment of theoretical matters was inadequate.
Certainly, whatever their number, these theories are not mutually exclusive
in terms of analyzing and ultimately justifying any system of punishment.
While the presidents should not be unduly criticized for failing to distinguish
clearly between various theories and purposes of punishment, they may be
criticized for having failed to examine properly the various theoretical implications of their legislative choices and actions. Just as Judge Frankel could
criticize Congress and the state legislatures for having "failed even to study
and resolve the most basic of the questions affecting criminal penalties, the
questions of justification and purpose," 241 the Presidents Commission can
be legitimately criticized for failing to consider similar issues.
Such criticism will be viewed with disfavor by some. There are those who
will argue that the Presidents Commission had to deal with political exigencies
that simply did not permit the luxury of expending the time necessary for
examining and reflecting upon the theoretical underpinnings of their system
of punishment.7 2 Certainly the presidents had to act decisively to strengthen
the integrity and academic image of their institutions. 24 3 The presidents could
and should, however, engage in a theoretical evaluation of the punishment
system created by the special Convention in 1985. Congress, ironically, a
clearly political body, which Judge Frankel and others have criticized for
failing to consider the theoretical underpinnings of their system of criminal
punishment, recently has engaged in considerable conceptual analysis in
evaluating their own version of fixed or mandatory sentencingY 4 If Congress
can take the time and expend the energy and resources necessary to evaluate
the theoretical underpinnings of its proposals for changes in the federal
criminal justice system, the Presidents Commission and the NCAA membership, as educators, can do as much.

239. Id.
240. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 221, at 60-61, noting that "any unitary theory of
punishment is inadequate."
241. Id. at 7.

242. I acknowledge that the Presidents must deal with political crises, but I also believe they
are inclined to consider, as a matter of training if nothing else, the theoretical or academic
side of their decisionmaking. I, unfortunately, must concede that the Presidents Commission's
act in converting their survey into the basis for a transformation of the NCAA's penal system
smacks of being political rather than educational or theoretical. Even this, however, does not
obviate my belief that the Presidents are academicians, in some measure, and are at least
inclined to consider theoretical questions.
243. See, e.g., supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
244. See discussion regarding Congressional action in Frankel & Orland, supra note 219, at
243-46.
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Indeed, the presidents may well have set just such a mechanism in place
by increasing their access to information and by creating a self-study system.
The self-study system whereby the institutions must examine their "institutional purpose and athletics policy" 245 on a regular (five-year) basis, should
provide the institutions an opportunity to explore the more theoretical dimensions of their programs. In this regard, the institutions should analyze
the ramifications of various theories of punishment in the intercollegiate
athletic context. In addition, the institutions should analyze various theories
of sport to assure that their athletic programs are founded on a theory fully
compatible with their educational mission. These self-studies should in time
help provide the fodder for more theoretical introspection at the national
level as well. In the interim, the Presidents Commission and the Council
should take the next step and commission a study at the national level to
explore just such theoretical issues, examining, for example, what the purposes of their system of punishment are and how successful their punishment
system is in effectuating those purposes relative to their institutions, institutional personnel and the student-athletes. If the presidents and the Council
do not take such steps, I am afraid, rather paradoxically, that Congress or
more aggressive state governments may intervene and perform their own
studies or hold hearings, which will in turn lead to an increase in government
control over intercollegiate athletics. In light of Congressional approval of
the Lukens' Commission to study intercollegiate athletics, this specter is
genuine.2 6
In summary, while the Presidents Commission has taken sincere and
perhaps even surprising steps to punish their institutions and themselves at
least indirectly, for violation of the NCAA rules, they have left some matters
unattended. In the future these issues must be addressed. The Presidents
Commission has taken the necessary steps to meet this challenge given that
they maintain their commitment to ensuring the integrity of their athletic
programs as a part of their academic mission. The implementation of such
corrective measures is likely to continue, particularly given the past and
present involvement of Congress. The impetus for reform at the national
level continues to be present. As academicians, the presidents and members
of the NCAA are by their nature better suited to perform the theoretical
tasks necessary to refine and justify their athletic programs than are members
of Congress. 7. Ironically, however, if the presidents and others fail to

245. See Proposal No. 1, discussed supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
246. See infra note 295 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the National
Commission created under legislation prepared by Representative Luken.
247. A Congressional Committee, of course, can call upon experts in developing regulatory
legislation. Such governmental committees are nevertheless by their nature political and presumably less inclined to rely on theoritical and educational purposes than are those directly
involved in education.
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address these issues as educators, choosing rather to respond to the commercial and political pressures that have plagued individual institutions in
the past, they may lose by default to Congress or some other regulatory
body that is willing and able to act despite those pressures.
From its inception, intercollegiate athletics has been characterized by an
excess of commercialization. The fact that the presidents have assumed an
active role in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, coupled with their
collective willingness to punish even themselves in definitive ways, may in
time be considered the critical or most effective movement during the past
140 years of intercollegiate athletics to restore academic integrity to the
intercollegiate athletic world. It is not enough, however, that the Presidents
Commission appears to be well positioned to exercise leadership and general
control over intercollegiate athletics by punishing themselves. Since the Presidents Commission also have undertaken to punish others-personnel (administration, coaches, and so on) and student-athletes-the nature of that
punishment also must be appraised.
B.

The PresidentsPunish Others

The Presidents Commission took decisive steps during the summer of 1985
to restore the integrity of their athletic programs by punishing themselves,
their institutions and others involved in their athletic programs found to
have violated NCAA rules. Since coaches and student-athletes have differing
interests and influences, this portion of the Article has been divided into
two parts: (1) an examination of the manner in which coaches and administrators or other related personnel are punished; and (2) the manner in
which student-athletes are punished.
1.

Punishing Coaches and Administrators

As the subsequent analysis shall demonstrate, the interests of coaches and
administrators in the punishment scheme adopted at the special Convention
in 1985 are not always identical. There is, nevertheless, sufficient overlap in
terms of their respective interests to warrant lumping them together for
analytical purposes.
Both coaches and administrators are under intense pressure to win, particularly at many Division I institutions. It is explicitly understood that
winning breeds commercial success, financial support from alumni, and even
increased enrollment and related support to the institution.2 Coaches have

248. Winning programs in the major sports of basketball and football produce revenues in
the millions of dollars for their institutions. The University of Michigan's football program,
for example, produces revenues in excess of $10 million each year, and the average Division I
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tended to be very susceptible to these pressures. Turnover among men's
basketball coaches at the Division I level was 23.1% last year, 249 and two

winning-but evidently not winning enough-football coaches were fired,
Ted Tollner at the University of Southern California,210 and Fred Akers at
the University of Texas.2'

In a related vein, Coach Ben Lindsey recently

sued the University of Arizona for failing to renew his multiyear contract
after he failed to rebuild their basketball program in his first season as coach
at Arizona. 2 2 Without any difficulty, one could amass one such story after
another of "less-than-successful" coaches being fired in an institution's
pursuit of the notoriety and dollars that accompany a winning program.
Gene Bartow, currently a highly "successful" basketball coach at the Uni-

versity of Alabama at Birmingham, warned would-be coaches that it is a
"high-risk profession. '

253

Similarly, Lou Campanelli, coach at the University

of California at Berkeley, added "[y]ou've got to be willing to move. You've

football program brings in revenues of approximately $3.4 million. See DONNELLY, College
Sports Under Fire, CONG. Q., Aug. 15, 1986, 11:6 at 591. During the course of the proceedings
against SMU's football program, it was revealed that during the years prior to its probation
it generated substantial profits. See Goodwin, supra note 217, at D24, col. 5. Indeed, average
profits of successful programs continually have been rising over the past few years. Since 1977,
for example, the average profit increased by $400,000 in major athletic programs posting a
profit. Fewer I-A, I-AA Programs are Reporting Profits, NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 1,
col. 1. During that same time period, however, the number of programs posting a profit
dropped and the less successful programs experienced an increase in their annual deficit of
$318,000. Id. at 14, col. 1 (emphasis added). It thus is clear that pressure to win and maintain
an economically viable program is intense. Winning programs entail other advantages, such as
expanded applicant pools. During the Doug Flutie era, for instance, Boston College's applicant
pool expanded between 25-40%, despite the fact that Flutie played during a period of time
when many schools were experiencing a drop in enrollment. See, e.g. Craig, Colleges Can't
Resist the Lure of TV Bucks, Sporting News; cf. Schubert & Gilley, The Student-Athlete's
PredictedMonetary Value to an Institution, 41 AcAD. A-H. J. 4 (Fall 1986).
249. It recently was noted that, "Entering the 1987 season, sixty-seven men's Division I
teams had changed head basketball coaches since last season. That is a turnover rate of 23.1%
(for 290 teams), which is a record high since coaching compilations began in 1950." VanValkenburg, Turnover Rate Among Basketball Coaches Hits All-Time High, NCAA News,
Jan. 7, 1987 at 4, col. 1.
250. Under Tollner in 1986, the Trojans of U.S.C. enjoyed moderate success, posting a
record of 7-4 and attending the Florida Citrus bowl. Coach Tollner also was selected to coach
in the East-West Shrine game. Tollner, nevertheless, was fired for failing to maintain U.S.C.'s
winning tradition. Felsher, Well-Traveled Ted Tollner Is A Real Survivor, Sporting News, Mar.
30, 1987, at 42, col. 1.
251. Fred Akers was the football coach at Texas for 10 years and was fired in 1986. His
record over that 10 year period was 86-13. When Akers was fired, DeLoss Dodds, the Athletic
Director at Texas, simply noted that, "sometimes it becomes necessary to bring in new energy
and leadership." Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 10, 1986, at 34.
252. Coach Lindsey, who was hired to rebuild the basketball program at the University of
Arizona, was fired after a single losing season. Lindsey ultimately was awarded $695,000 in a
breach of contract suit against the University. Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 15, 1986, at 46.
253. Wieberg, UncertaintyBecomes a Way of Life for Coaches, NCAA News, Dec. 1, 1986,
at 2, col. 1. That article noted that there were five new basketball coaches in the eight-team
Metro Atlantic Conference and four each in the Big Eight, Big Ten and ECAC North Atlantic
Conferences.

1038

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:985

got to be flexible. It's a risk of the job, and it's getting riskier each year.
Everyone wants to win now. No one wants to [or can afford to] be patient. ' ' 214 The pressure on coaches and athletic administrator to produce
"winners" is intense. 255 Given the massive capital investment in costly facilities and the need to support numerous economically dependent sports
with one or two successful ones, generally basketball and football, coaches
in those major sports and athletic directors alike know they must deliver a
winner.
Few coaches in major programs have tenure, and their job security is
correspondingly limited. 2- 6 Athletic directors and related personnel enjoy a
bit more security, but they too are expected to produce commercially successful "winners" because the bottom-line of their athletic budget must
balance. It might be argued, of course, that since successful coaches often
make far more money than even the presidents of their universities 25 7 they
should be willing to accept the additional risks that attend their profession.
This point, however, misses the mark, particularly if one believes that academic integrity is a matter of the highest priority. Indeed, the argument
that coaches should simply assume the risk of job insecurity merely serves
as a further reminder of how deeply entrenched the profit-motive is in
intercollegiate athletic programs.
Against this background, the Presidents Commission acted at the special
Convention of 1985 to ensure the integrity of their athletic programs by
passing stiff penalties applicable against those involved in violating the NCAA
rules and acted again at the annual Convention in 1987 to promote cost
containment measures in their athletic programs. These efforts were designed
to constitute a major first step in the direction of economic and related
retrenchment. In the interim coaches and administrators, nevertheless, face
a dilemma-they must win (either build, maintain or expand the success of
a major program) and they must do so without bending the rules. Somewhat
like incumbents in Congress, established programs have a distinct advantage
over newcomers in this process-they have a winning tradition, a strong
reputation with recruits, and the economic basis upon which to maintain

254. Id. at 2, col. 1.
225. Id. at 3, col. 1. That article stressed that athletic directors must support a number of
economically weak programs with a few successful ones.
256. Vince Dooley, head football coach at the University of Georgia, recently stated that,
"[i]t should be remembered that relatively few coaches enjoy the security of tenure that is
bestowed upon faculty. In fact, surprisingly few coaches remain at one institution long enough
even to enjoy retirement benefits." Its a Misconception That Cheating in Athletics is Widespread,
NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
257. See, e.g., Stevenson, Athletic Supplies: Stakes are High, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986,
at B9, col. 1. It is pointed out that a basketball coach at a major program can earn as much
as $100,000 on a shoe contract alone; Oliva, supra note 2, at 32, col. 1. Chancellor Oliva
refers to coaches as "corporate managers."
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their programs. Even those institutions, however, are susceptible to similar
forms of pressure, since there are always ambitious coaches and programs
desirous of stepping into the winning limelight.
One can easily view this dim picture as evidence that the presidents are
being hypocritical in demanding strict compliance with the rules while also
requiring that their coaches provide winners and their athletic administrators
provide an athletic budget that is perpetually in the black. There are, however, some indications that the presidents and others in the NCAA sincerely
may be sensitive to addressing these countervailing pressures. The Presidents
25 9
Commission,2 8 for example, with the support of the athletic directors,
recently took steps to engage in cost containment related to their athletic
programs. While one might view this cost containment effort as little more
than another thinly veiled effort by chief executive officers to suck greater
profit out of their athletic programs, such austerity also might be viewed as
a genuine effort to deal with the pitfalls that economic pressures place on
intercollegiate athletic programs. If this latter purpose accurately reflects the
presidents' intent, it could have the beneficial effect of lowering economic
pressures on athletic programs. Similarly, the presidents' efforts to obtain
information regarding the sources of income for coaches 26° may be viewed
as more than just a jealous ploy to restrict a coach's income-it rather may
be seen as an effort to reach all potential excesses under control. If, however,
the presidents are serious about the latter course, they should be willing to
reduce some of the risk faced by coaches. Indeed, the high remuneration
258. The special Convention to be held in the summer of 1987 is limited to "those issues
that relate to containing costs of intercollegiate athletics programs and to maintaining a proper
balance between intercollegiate athletics programs and other institutional programs." Schedule
of Meetings Set for Special Convention, NCAA News, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1. See also
Farrell & Lederman, NCAA PresidentsCall New Meeting in Sports Reform, Chron. of Higher
Educ., Jan. 14, 1987, at 1. In that article Chancellor Heyman is quoted as having said that,
"The balance [between intercollegiate athletics and the academic missions of some institutions
of higher learning] has gotten out of hand, in part because the tremendous costs of maintaining
athletics programs often means that allocations of resources overshadow what are necessarily
the institution's intention in having a sports program." Id. at 42.
259. While there was some tension at the Convention in January of 1987 between the athletic
directors and the Presidents Commission, the athletic directors generally agreed with the cost
containment efforts of the Presidents. See Farrell, Mood of Reform Dominates NCAA Meeting,
Chron. of Educ., Jan. 21, 1987, at 33, col. 2.
260. See Boosters Barred From Recruiting; Coaches Income to Be Watched, Chron. of
Higher Educ., Jan. 21, 1987, at 34, col. 4. Under legislation passed by the 1987 general
Convention, coaches were: (1) required to report all athletically related income to their chief
executive officer; (2) limited in their use of the university logo for economic purposes; (3) required to receive prior approval before receiving individual compensation from equipment manufacturers; and (4) prohibited from receiving compensation for scheduling arrangements.
ments.
Implementing this scheme may not, however, be an easy task. Recently, for example, the
University of Arizona offered their present basketball coach, Lute Olson, a five-year, $85,000
per year contract, but Olson resisted because he opposed the inclusion of a provision in the
contract requiring disclosure of outside income. See Coaches' Corner, Sporting News, Mar.
23, 1987, at 19, col. 4.
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received by major coaches is easily viewed as a function of the high-risk
nature of their employment, and alterations must be made that would lower
the job security risk at the same time that excessive incomes are brought
under control.
If the presidents are sincere, they could take additional steps to indicate
their commitment in this regard. The presidents could seriously evaluate a
coach's ability as an educator and not simply as an effective corporate
manager who is able to build and market a major product using studentathletes as the utilitarian means to that end. 26' In so doing, the presidents

could grant tenure, or at least as a middle-ground, they could extend (and
honor) long-term contracts to their coaches. This would help mitigate the

risk involved in coaching and might lower both the pressure to win-at-allcosts and the income expectations of coaches. A move toward economic

austerity is always painful to some in its initial stages, although it is less
painful when all parties understand that they must sacrifice for a higher or
better cause (or even just for survival). The presidents apparently recognize
that such cost containment is part of the prescription for what ails overcommercialized intercollegiate athletic programs. 262 Such a move might be a
step toward restoring dignity and, reason to the burgeoning big business
attitude that prevails in intercollegiate athletics, particularly when the facts
suggest that much of the economic success often comes at the expense of

the careers and lives of the individuals (administrators, coaches and studentathletes) involved in the program. Some participants, of course, may be
willing "victims," but one will never know until the reactions to a longterm effort toward economic retrenchment in the interest of academic values
26
can be gauged. 1

261. See, e.g., Oliva, supra note 2. The recent hiring of Bill Curry as football coach at the
University of Alabama was a bold move on the part of President Joab Thomas that should
be applauded. Unfortunately, in some'circles in Alabama, the only fitting response was a death
threat to President Thomas. See Curry'sHiring by Tide Brings Death Threats, Sporting News,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 45.
262. In this regard, it would be appropriate to hear more debate and perhaps even more
negative response on campus when a new building project or other expansion of an athletic
program is proposed.See, for example, the effort of the faculty at the University of Tennessee,
to stop a construction project initiated by the athletics department at their institution. See
Wong & Ensor, supra note 4, at 152-55.
263. The initial reaction on the part of students, faculty and administrators of SMU to the
dismantling-retrenchment of that program may be a good barometer. It can only be hoped
that SMU will receive additional support from constituencies approving SMU's effort to "clean
up" their program. It would be fitting, for example, if students offered to assume more of
the costs of the athletic programs that they are or sought to be the intended beneficiaries of,
by accepting modest increases in student fees to run the athletic program.
I, unfortunately, am not heartened by some of the response that seems to have occurred at
SMU. A recent article discussing SMU's woes noted that:
The school is going to suffer grievously in financing because of the football
scandal. A United Methodist Church panel with the power to sever church ties
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The ramifications for coaches and athletic administrators of the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics helps put the penal reforms adopted
at the special Convention in June of 1985 in perspective. Coaches were

punished in a number of ways. For the first time coaches, as individuals,
were punished directly with the passage of Proposal No. 4. This provision

provided for direct punishment of coaches, irrespective of whether or not
264
the coaches still were employed at the school where the violations occurred.

Under the provisions of that NCAA Bylaw, coaches could be temporarily
or permanently suspended from coaching. This is an onerous penalty in and
of itself; it was, however, but part of a larger system. Coaches and other
personnel also were punished under Proposal No. 3, particularly that portion

amending NCAA Enforcement Procedure sections 7-(c)-(d).2 6 Additonally,
in an effort to cooperate with the NCAA and to demonstrate a willingness

to clean up its program, it is conceivable that an institution may occasionally
sacrifice its coach or an athletic administrator as evidence of a good faith

(to the NCAA or the Conference, not necessarily to the coach) compliance
effort.

2 66

It is therefore clear that the legislation adopted at the special Convention
constitutes a harsh punishment system for any coach or administrator. Among
the punitive provisions adopted which apply with particular force against

coaches and administrators are: (1) NCAA Enforcement Procedure section

with SMU was scheduled to meet in emergency sessions to discuss the school's
football program. The panel could remove SMU from its umbrella, thereby
depriving the school of church funding.
But that's only part of the picture.
The loss of the football program will result in the underfunding of other school
sports, all of which are supported by football.
Still worse, according to a copyright story in the Dallas Morning News, is that
high school seniors and wealthy contributors have pulled back from SMU. Donations to the school may be off $10 million to $20 million this fiscal year and
the admissions department may have to lower its standards to attract an adequate
number of freshmen, the newspaper reported.
A Fine Kettle of SMU Fish, Sporting News, Mar. 23, 1987, at 43, col. 3. I certainly would
hope that the reaction would be otherwise. Given the stringency of the penalties already invoked
against SMU's program, there is little need for more. The systemic canker in all likelihood
cannot survive the penalties invoked; the program will have to be rebuilt, hopefully on a sounder
academic model. I would argue, therefore, that the supporters of SMU's academic program
should respond with added support in this time of crisis, rather than a plethora of threatened
lawsuits.
264. See supra notes 185-86.
265. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
266. Objections to using institutional personnel as "sacrificial lambs" to satisfy the NCAA
or the Conference are usually raised with regard to using student-athletes for such purposes. See
generally Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 24 STA. L. RFv. 903, 907-08 (1972); Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 29,
1986, at 37, col. 1. It is clear, however, that institutions often are enticed to use their coaching
staffs in the same sacrificial manner. This has prompted the NCAA to take steps to assure
that coaches afid personnel are accorded a measure of due process to avoid the institutional
proclivity to find an appropriate sacrifice.
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7-(c), providing for a "minimum penalty" for "major violations," except
in unique cases based on specified reasons set forth by the Committee on
Infractions; and (2) NCAA Enforcement Procedure section 7-(d), the socalled "death penalty," which requires that restrictions imposed on a coach
by the Committee on Infractions for Violations will be applied against that
coach, even if she is employed at a new institution.
NCAA Enforcement Procedure section 7-(C) 26 7 deals with "major" violations and applies to both coaches and administrators. It specifies certain
mandatory or fixed sentences ranging in severity from termination to suspension or reassignment of duties for at least one year. These penalties are
to be applied directly against institutional staff members (this term clearly
applies to coaches and administrators) who knowingly have engaged in or
condoned a major violation. Even in its least severe form, the prescribed
penalty in section 7-(c)-"[r]eassignment of duties within the institution to
a position that does not include contact with prospective or enrolled studentathletes or representatives of the institution's athletics interest for at least
one year"-would have an immense impact on a coach's or administrator's
career. Reassignment of a coach within an athletic department effectively
might require that the institution hire another individual to fill the reassigned
coach's or athletic administrator's prior duties, ultimately leaving the coach
involved in the violation without a job in the area in which she originally
was hired.
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the Committee on- Infractions
will apply this provision. There are, of course, two escape routes for the
Committee should it decide to impose less draconian measures: (1) it could
specify the reasons why the present case is unique; or (2) it could find that
the coach or administrator did not "knowingly engage in or condon[e] a
major violation." As to the former matter, it remains to be seen whether
the Committee, in specifying exceptions, will develop a comprehensive common law related to what types of cases are "unique." As to the latter point,
it will be interesting to note whether the Committee (and the Council in
event of an appeal) will find that constructive knowledge is enough to
constitute "knowingly engaging in or condoning a major violation."
The application of the "death penalty" is, for the most part, more indirect
in its effect on coaches and administrators than is section 7-(c). This is true
because it is directed at "institutions" involved in repeat, major violations.
But, given that section 7-(d)-(l) prohibits all members coaching in a sport
from participating in some or all 'outside' competition in the sport involved
for one or two sports seasons, 2 8 the effect can be quite direct with respect

267. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
268. Section 7-(d)-(1) actually provides for, "Itihe prohibition of some or all 'outside'
competition in the sport involved in the latest major violation for one or two sports seasons
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to coaches. As such, the implementation of section 7-(d) as to coaches raises
two potential issues. First, a coach, in some measure, is being punished for
the prior violations of the institution or its staff (the first major violation
that is necessary to trigger application of section 7-(d) may well have occurred
in a different sport or prior to the arrival of the coach being punished under
the "death penalty."). It will be recalled that two major violations are
required in a five-year period to invoke section 7-(d); for example, if the
football program at an institution was involved in the first violation and
the basketball program was involved in the second violation, the basketball
coach could receive an increased penalty attributable, in part, to the past
violations of the football program. Indeed, the basketball coach or coaching
staff being punished under section 7-(d) may not have even been employed
by the institution at the time the first violation occured. This raises troublesome retroactivity 269 and perhaps even double-jeopardy problems. 270 Second, if the penalty imposed on the coach by the institution, the conference
or the NCAA is more stringent than that imposed on the institution itself
(even though the coach may have only been involved in one of the two
major violations occurring at the institution in the applicable five-year period), the effect of the penalty may be to exclude her from coaching. Such
a result could be quite unfair in that the coach may become the scapegoat
for the past as well as for the present sins of an institution. In this regard,

and the prohibition of all coaching staff members in that sport from involvement directly or
indirectly in any coaching activities during a two-year period." As such, the provision limits
the institution's participation in 'outside' competition for "one or two seasons," while coaching
responsibilities are limited "during a two-year period." This apparent discrepancy was qualified,
however, when it was pointed out that the limitation on the coaches will normally be of the
same duration as that imposed against the institution, although the Committee would have
authority to impose a more stringent penalty on a more culpable coach.
269. The debate over the retroactivity problem is discussed at length supra notes 159-68 and
accompanying text. See also NCAA News, July 3, 1985, for a legislative interpretation clarifying
that "for an institution in a previous major case [it will be recalled that the "major"/
"secondary" distinction was itself first drawn in the legislation adopted during the 1985 special
Convention] to be considered as a repeat violator, the second major offense must be one that
occurs after September 1, 1985, and within five years of the starting date of the initial major
penalty." In cases in which an official inquiry is issued subsequent to the conclusion of the
special Convention in June of 1985, coaches, in turn, will be covered, even if they move
elsewhere. Id. A coach, therefore, could suffer the full impact of penalty for a major violation
in some instances where the violation in which the coach was involved took place prior to the
convening of the special Convention. Furthermore, in instances in which the "death penalty"
could be invoked for a repeat violation, the coach can be punished to a greater extent even
though the coach was not involved in the first violation. The potential for inequity in such
situations, particularly in light of the likelihood that some institutions may be inclined to use
the coach as a scapegoat to lessen the punishment for themselves as institutions, is obvious.
270. Mike McGee, athletic director at the University of Southern California, noted that, "[a]
program that already satisfied the sanctions imposed earlier are [sic] being exposed to double
jeopardy." L.A. Times, Part 3, at I. Even David Berst of the NCAA has noted that the
possibility of "double jeopardy" exists in cases like SMU's, where the death penalty is applied
retroactively. See Death Penalty Hint in New Woes at Southern Methodist, Sporting News,
Nov. 24, 1986, at 32, col. 1.
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those meting out the penalty should be quite sensitive to the various and

often conflicting interests of the coach and the institution in the infractions
enforcement process.
Finally, Proposal No. 4, as adopted at the special Convention amending
NCAA Bylaw 5-6-(d)-(3), requires that restrictions imposed under NCAA

Enforcement Procedure section 7 follow the coach to a new employing
institution. Application of this provision may create some difficult problems

for the institution that hired the coach without knowledge of the former
violations. It would not be surprising to find that institutions hiring new

coaches will add a condition in their contract with the new coach limiting
their obligations in the event that the strictures of section 7 are applied
against that coach following her arrival to the new institution. If the new
institution fails to do so, it may find itself in the precarious position of
having hired a new coach that is unable to serve in that capacity. Even
absent the presence of such a provision in the coach's contract, the contract
might be voidable by the institution. 27'
Beyond the preceding interpretive problems, the legislation passed during
the special Convention raises other general concerns. It is arguable that,
given the severity of these provisions and others that have been or might
hereafter be appended to them, coaches and administrators may feel com-

pelled to seek a much more active role in the legislative process generally.
Indeed, administrators already have taken this route. During the 1987 annual
Convention a battle of sorts erupted between the athletic directors and the
presidents. 272 The athletic directors, recently having been charged with ex-

271. The coach may be held to have a duty to disclose past violations or the contract may
be held to have been frustrated in its essential purpose. See, e.g., Professor Farnsworth's
discussion of temporary impracticability or frustration in E. FAR SWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.9,

at 700-02 (1982). It is clear, however, that such a risk would be better handled at the drafting
stage.
272. See supra note 259. Ken Denlinger, a correspondent with the Washington Post, is quoted
as stating that, "A welcome scene at the NCAA Convention [January, 1987] was athletic
directors and presidents fussing at one another. For ever so long, there was no dialogue at
all." Denlinger, Now, There's Hope for College Sports, NCAA News, Feb. 4, 1987, at 2, col.
1. Elsewhere it was noted that:
Led by a handful of prominent athletic directors, the membership voted to
reject the presidents' call for withdrawal of 6 of the 15 proposals, igniting what
some predict will become a battle of wills ..... "I think this sends a message to
the presidents," said Homer Rice, athletic director at the Georgia Institute of
Technology. "They need to listen to us, the athletic directors, before they set up
the agenda for the special convention [in June of 1987] ....
[W]e want costcutting. We know there are problems. This is not a battle with the presidents'
commission. But we want to be consulted."
It appears that they will be. Before the convention got under way, the NCAA
council appointed a committee of athletic directors, headed by Eugene F. Corrigan,
athletic director at the University of Notre Dame, to work with the presidents
commission, in developing legislation for the special convention.
Lederman & Farrell, Mood of Reform Dominates NCAA Meeting; President's Group Sets a
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ercising control over the NCAA as "a trade association,"

273

have had to

exert pressure to counterbalance what they consider to be the potentially
more extreme efforts of the Presidents Commission. 274 The athletic directors
are generally well positioned to do so based on their historical status within
the NCAA 275 and since they maintain an active national organization, the
National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics. 276 Coaches, on the

Whole New Agenda, Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 21, 1987, at 34, col. 1. See also Gleason,
infra note 278.
It is clear, however, that not all athletic directors view the reform movement positively. Frank
Broyles, athletic director at Arkansas, reacted to the penalty imposed by the Committee on
Infractions in the SMU case by noting that he was "disappointed" and that he felt the penalty
was "unduly harsh." Broyles added that the NCAA's action [and, presumably, other efforts
to reform the NCAA enforcement system] sent a "signal to the rest of the members that
nothing can be gained by cooperation with the NCAA, and it would be best for a member to
stonewall any investigation." Marcin, Does the Penalty Fit the Crime?, Sporting News, Mar.
9, 1987, at 42, col. 1. While it is clear that Broyles is responding primarily to the disincentive
to cooperate in NCAA investigations, I believe his comment runs deeper, and criticizes the
current effort to obtain balance in intercollegiate athletics by decommercializing aspects of it
as the Committee on Infractions at least indirectly sought to do in the SMU case. It furthermore
appears that SMU's cooperation may well have contributed to a lessening of the force of the
penalty imposed on their program by the Committee on Infractions. In all the clamor related
to the stringency of the penalty invoked against SMU, it often was forgotten that the Committee
clearly could have imposed even a more stringent penalty.
273. In a letter dated July 24, 1986 and directed to his colleagues in the House of Representatives, Representative Luken referred pejoratively to the NCAA as a "trade association of
athletic directors."
274. See supra notes 261, 275 and the articles cited therein. Robert James of the Atlantic
Coast Conference recently recognized the potential for compromise among athletic directors,
coaches, faculty representatives, the presidents and the conferences when he stated that, "When
you get the athletic directors and the coaches and the faculty reps and the presidents all talking,
and the conferences talking to each other, all of us combined should be able to come up with
a reasonable, mutually acceptable program." Lederman, Athletic Directors Block Reform,
Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 18, 1987, at 32, col. 5. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, James failed to mention the need for some input from student-athletes, who also
will be severely affected by any collective action taken by other more powerful forces at the
institutional, conference and NCAA levels.
275. Certainly Representative Luken's declaration that the NCAA is but a trade association
for athletic directors is overstated. See supra note 273. By virtue of their proximity to issues
affecting athletic departments as a whole, however, they will continue to be a viable force
simply owing to their knowledge of and interest in these issues.
276. See Gleason, The Benefits of Athletic ParticipationAre Many, NCAA News, Dec. 8,
1986, at 3, col. 1 (discussing the achievements of the National Association of Collegiate Directors
of Athletics (NACDA) during the past few years). Gleason, the assistant executive director of
NACDA argues that:
We [the NACDA] have laid more groundwork for improvement in intercollegiate
athletics in the past three years than in any similar period in our history. [The
NACDA] has led the assault [on the drug issue] with numerous drug-education
and testing clinics and audio-visual materials. The NCAA has organized a Presidents Commission to combat issues of academic integrity and recruiting concerns.
Third, major college directors of athletics have founded an autonomous organization to seek more control over legislative matters.
Though the mechanism for improvement is in place, we'd be fooling the public
and ourselves to suggest that all is well and good in our industry. College athletics
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other hand, are not quite as well positioned. In the past, coaches largely

have been willing to rely on the athletic director for input in the legislative
process and have tended to be less concerned with unifying at the national
level. 277 If coaches are placed under increasing pressure, however, it is conceivable that they will assume a more cohesive front in an effort to influence
legislation. It has been suggested, for example, that the coaches should form
a union. 278 While I generally oppose such a move, I would acknowledge that
its effect would not be wholly unsavory. If coaches were to unionize, they
might be able to aid efforts designed to ensure that intercollegiate athletics

resist further trends to become overly commercial by requiring institutions
to offer coaches long-term contracts or perhaps even tenure. Rather than

securing high incomes for coaches at risk, a move to unionize might lower
the income potential attending coaching at the highest levels while lessening
the risks currently attendant with coaching at those levels. 279 Regardless of
these developments, it is clear that coaches will seek a greater role in the
decisionmaking process in the future. If the coaches' input is significantly
resisted, they may be compelled to unionize or take other more drastic steps
to influence the legislative process.

If the Presidents Commission and the NCAA refuse to respond to the
legitimate interests of coaches and administrators, a major conflict may arise
during the coming decade, particularly if the due process interest of coaches
and administrators is waylaid. In the past, individual coaches and administrators (and student-athletes) occasionally have served as convenient scape-

goats for institutions in their efforts to placate the Committee on Infractions.
By firing or removing an offending coach who participated in or permitted

her program to be involved in a major infraction, the institution trusts that
it will receive a more lenient sentence or penalty. 2 0 To some extent, as

is becoming more and more complex. Administrators and coaches need to do a
little more soul-searching and add some legislative bite to our moral bark.
Id. at 3, col. 2.
277. Coaches have for the most part tended to maintain separate coaching organizations
designated by sports to protect their interests in their individual sport rather than a general
national organization established to protect interests of coaches as a collective matter.
278. In response to the pressure placed on coaches, Florida State University basketball coach
Pat Kennedy recently went on record by stating, with obvious ambivalence, that, "[as Al
McGuire proposed years ago] coaches need to form a union to protect themselves. At the same
time, I just don't think that's what coaching is all about." Wieberg, Uncertainty Becomes a
Way of Life for Coaches, NCAA News, Dec. 1, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
279. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text. Unions of this sort, such as the professional sports unions, tend to protect the interests of the rank-and-file membership while leaving
some latitude for the interests of the higher paid members. The union, therefore, would in all
likelihood address the interests of the whole, which might be quite different from the interests
of the most powerful and economically secure coaches, while permitting the few-the wealthier
coaches-a modicum of latitude. The union no doubt would leave higher paid coaches with
some freedom if for no other reason than that many rank-and-file coaches may foresee themselves
as one day joining the ranks of the well-to-do, secure few.
280. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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coaches and administrators are given a greater opportunity to articulate their

interests in the enforcement process-this input logically should expand with
the establishment of more severe and direct penalties in 1985-such concerns
are abated. I, however, would assert that the NCAA should remain sensitive

to the scapegoat syndrome and should weigh institutional and individual
culpability with care. While the offending coach or administrator initially

may appear most culpable, the NCAA should look very closely at institutional
pressure placed on the coach in balancing the culpability between the insti-

tution and its personnel. 2 1 At least from a distance it would appear that
the Committee on Infractions could focus a bit more, as it did recently in
the SMU case, 22 on systemic commercial issues and pressures instead of the
symptomatic transgression of coaches.

More specificly, institutions, conferences and the NCAA need to be vigilant
in offering enhanced due process protections to coaches and administrators.

Institutions ought to be willing to extend more than the modicum of due
process required by law when a property or liberty interest is or potentially

may be implicated.2 3 It is regrettable that educational entities seem inclined

merely to follow the rather ill-defined letter of the law of due process, rather

than endeavoring to establish procedures exemplifying the spirit of the law
by voluntarily providing the highest level of due process possible. This is
particularly important given the broad discretion provided in the applicable

281. As the recent revelations regarding the possible direct involvement of members of the
Board of Governors at SMU in the illicit pay-offs to student-athletes indicate, culpability may
extend well beyond the coaches and administrators, and occasionally beyond the presidents
themselves. See Thomas, SMU Governors Allowed Illicit Athlete Pay, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1987, at Al col. 3. But see Frank, SMU's Board Rebuts Clements on Payments, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 5, 1987, at B25, col.5. Indeed, as the SMU case illustrates, the problem may in some
part be attributable to the community at large, and to the powerful role of boosters and other
dominant forces within that community. See Applebome, Troubles at SMU Reflect 'Ethos' of
Dallas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at All. col. I.
Unfortunately, many others, some of whom are less culpable, will be injured directly and
indirectly by the actions of some officials within and without the institution. Innocent staff
will, no doubt, have to be laid off, as the program or dependant programs suffer cuts in
revenue, and student-athletes and students alike suffer. The student-athletes will have to transfer
elsewhere or cease to participate for a period of time, and the students and student-athletes
will have to suffer some sense of a reputation loss.
282. See Lederman NCAA Bars Footballat Southern Methodist for Year; PenaltiesAre the
Toughest Ever, Chron. of Higher Educ., Mar. 4, 1987, at 1, col. 2; Text of NCAA Infractions
Panel's Report on Southern Methodists's Rule Violations, Chron. of Higher Educ., Mar. 4,
1987, at 33, col. 1. In that report the Committee on Infractions noted that SMU, with the
help of outside individuals and a booster who had supposedly been disassociated from the
program, engaged in a systematic effort to gain a competitive edge to enhance its program.
Frank Remington, Chair of the Committee on Infractions, stated that, "Our purpose was to
send a very strong message ....
SMU wants to build a program gradually. Now it has that
chance." Goodwin, supra note 217, at D21, col. 2. The nature of the penalties, which effectively
dismantle SMU's program, is such that the commercial impetus to build a competitive program
is lessened.
283. See G. ScHUEnRT, R. SMrrH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 27, at 66-73.
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penal provisions, where the rule of law (which provides perhaps the best
form of notice) is sacrificed in significant measure for the fairness that is
believed to attend discretion to decide "unique" cases on an individual basis.
As such, I do not advocate a full-blown legal hearing, but -I do favor greater
sensitivity to and respect for the rights and dignity of personnel and studentathletes at all levels of the enforcement process. Certainly the processes
utilized by an institution are or ought in some measure to be educative, and
academic institutions cannot escape their moral and educational responsibility
in this regard by simply doing what is minimally required by the law. This
is particularly true when student-athletes are involved. Indeed, if extending
greater due process protection to athletic employees and students could help
ameliorate a perceived drift toward unionization and internecine conflict, an
institution could reap substantial long term benefits from such actions. I,
therefore, would recommend that the NCAA take to heart its expressed
commitment to due process, 214 and commission an extensive study focusing
in significant part on student-athlete and employees rights issues. In pursuing
this course of action, the NCAA should examine means by which they could
extend or offer more notice and fairer hearings to those impacted by their
enforcement and legislative processes.
Following this course, the NCAA also might consider ways in which it
could modify its current sentencing enforcement process to give coaches,
administrators and student-athletes greater input into the process. Given the
institution's ability to make encompassing suggestions or proposals preliminary to the imposition of penalties by the Committee on Infractions, employees and student-athletes, whose interests are often in opposition to those
of their institution, should be given an opportunity to be heard and to react
to proposals at all stages during the process. Indeed, an actual sentencing
hearing might be an effective means of assuring that input is received.
Currently there is no separate sentencing hearing prior to the unilateral
imposition of penalties by the Committee on Infractions. If institutions,
conferences and the NCAA do not become increasingly sensitive to due
process and related issues, we may well anticipate a proliferation in legal
costs at all levels 285 and possible intervention by governmental or related
entities in the enforcement process to insure that the rights and interests of

284. It will be recalled that, in referring Proposal No. 3-3, some members of the NCAA
noted that they were wholly committed to due process even though they did not expressly
support Proposal 3-3. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
285. Litigation costs have become a major concern at the NCAA level. See, e.g., ANNUAL
REPORTS, supra note 9, at 322-23 for a discussion regarding ever-increasing legal costs, which
in 1984-85 alone stood at $1.45 million. These costs are almost certain to increase in the future
as severe penalties are imposed and resisted. Litigation costs may soon exceed the entire
enforcement budget, which recently was stated to be $1.86 million. Whitford, Why This Man
Can't Stop the Cheating, Sport, Sept. 1986, at 52, col. 1.
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employees, sti.dent-athletes and other under-represented groups are adequately protected.
These reflections on due process naturally lead to more theoretical inquiries. As to the presidents' theory of punishment, it is clear upon examination of the terms of NCAA Enforcement Procedure sections 7-(c),-(d)
and Proposal No. 4, that the Presidents Commission sought both to deter
and to punish offending coaches and administrators. Nearly all the punitive
provisions that apply to coaches and administrators, for example, may be
read as seeking to deter violations at the outset as well as to rehabilitate
offenders. As applied, however, penalties for violations also may be imposed
in a purely nonconsequentialist manner, seeking to impose suffering on the
wrongdoer. Such overlapping purposes do not necessarily render the punitive
provisions unacceptable as a theoretical matter; such purposes and justifications are rarely unitary. The apparent failure to consider the individual
interests of institutions, athletic administrators, coaches and student-athletes,
and the manner in which the provisions are applied to those respective and
sometimes differing interests, however, is subject to legitimate criticism.
Particularly in the case of groups which are under-represented in the NCAA
hierarchy and in the enforcement and legislative processes at all levels-the
student-athletes and to some extent personnel-it would not be too much
to ask that the Presidents Commission more clearly articulate the purposes
behind and the justifications for establishing and imposing harsh penalties
on those under-represented individuals. Ongoing empirical studies of the
relationship between the penalties imposed and the results achieved are in
order. The flexibility included in the penalty provisions, of course, ultimately
may permit the Committee on Infractions, and perhaps even the Council,
on appeal, to do a better job of expressing the purposes of and justification
for penalties in specific cases (for example, NCAA Enforcement Procedure
sections 7-(c),-(d) require that the Committee on Infractions specify its reasons in making exceptions in unique cases). In any event, general reflection
upon the deeper theoretical issues related to punishment are needed. The
seriatim determination of individual cases by the Committee on Infractions
may not be the best means of explicating such theory286 and it certainly
should not be the exclusive means utilized to delineate the theoretical underpinnings of the NCAA's enforcement process. The broad discretion provided under the applicable penal provisions,u 7 moreover, creates additional
problems at the theoretical level. Typically, neither a clear effort to explicate
the underlying theory in the form of the purpose, justification or intent of

286. In the past, it would appear that the Committee on Infractions merely has articulated
the nature and extent of the applicable penalty when it imposed a specific penalty in a specific
case without intentionally and explicitly discussing either theories of basic punishment generally
or sentencing theory in particular.
287. For a discussion of the discretion issue, see supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
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the provisions adopted in the summer of 1985 nor a clear explication of
precise rules has occurred. Indeed, given that the penal system created was
merely designed in response to a general survey of the presidents, the punitive
measures have a largely political, as opposed to theoretical, origin; unless,
of course, the presidents individually weighed the theoretical implications of
their answers prior to answering each survey question. Even in that unlikely
event, the presidents did not explicate that theory in a manner that might
offer additional notice and direction to the parties subject to that process.
Even the Committee on Infractions lacks insight as to what, as a theoretical
matter, was in the minds of the presidents. Parties at all levels are left in
some doubt. Further explication is certainly warranted and would assist both
the parties in protecting and articulating their interests under the punishment
scheme and the Committee on Infractions in applying its provisions.
In summary, problems remain with regard to commercialization, lack of
access to the decisionmaking process, lack of finely tuned process provisions
and a failure to explicate theory as related to the enforcement of the penal
provisions against coaches and athletic administrators. Given these shortcomings, it should be noted that the punitive provisions adopted by the
special Convention apply to the student-athlete in even greater force than
they do to athletic administrators and coaches who, by virtue of their
positions, have greater power than do under-represented and often naive
student-athletes. I therefore turn next to a discussion of the ramifications
of the work of the special Convention for student-athletes.
2.

Punishing Student-Athletes

If the work of the Presidents Commission during the special Convention
of 1985 is evaluated from an academic perspective, the most important issue
raised would be how that work affected student-athletes. Charged with the
obligation of educating their students, the presidents maintain a special
fiduciary relationship with their student-athletes.
It is in this regard that the over-commercialization of intercollegiate sports
has had its most pernicious effect. In this sense, student-athletes occasionally
have been looked at as little more than products to be packaged and sold
to an avid consuming public. 288 As a result, educational institutions often

288. For antitrust purposes, for example, student-athletes are often considered "inputs." See
Koch, supra note 6, at 11, where the author states that:
the key to understanding the development of modern intercollegiate athletics is
an understanding of the competition for, and use of inputs such as studentathletes. The development of the NCAA ... has primarily come about because
most university-firms have desired to limit competition between themselves concerning how they may hire and utilize their student-athlete inputs.
Recent articles delineating the purported worth of premier college athletes emphasize this point.
See sources supra note 248.

1987]

NCAA DEATH PENALTY

find themselves in a dilemma relative to their student-athletes. While they
are commissioned to teach values and to elevate other academic objectives
above pure commercialism, institutions are under mounting pressure to perpetuate the profit-motive in intercollegiate athletics. 2 9 Thus, rather than
emphasizing some educational values or a basic theory of sport in organizing
and administering their athletic program, many institutions involved in bigtime athletics must take a sometimes hypocritical, or at least ambivalent,
stance regarding their student-athletes. These institutes must ensure that their
product is marketable-that it must be a "winner"-while simultaneously
rationalizing that it serves some educational value or values. 29° While winning
and educational values may not always be mutually exclusive, it is certain
that at times they are; and at those times, the institution must make a choice.
Unfortunately, all the contemporary pressure on athletic programs to remain
economically productive is not counterbalanced by consideration of the student-athletes' interests since the student-athletes are woefully under-represented at all decisionmaking levels. Their interests often are not heard at
any level in the dialogue over the various issues confronting intercollegiate
athletics.
There are, it would appear, two ways in which these often related problems
of commercialization and under-representation can be minimized from the
student-athlete's perspective. First, and as previously noted, efforts to contain
costs related to athletic programs will help by relieving some of the economic
pressure that currently plagues many major programs. Second, steps can be
taken to increase student and faculty input into the decisionmaking process
at all levels.
In this regard, I would make a couple of suggestions. At the institutional
and the conference levels, and perhaps ultimately even at the NCAA level,
the interests and views of student-athletes should be actively sought and
considered. The self-study process at the institutional level could be an
important step in that direction. 29' In determining the "institutional purpose
and athletics philosophy" in that self-study, the interests of the studentathlete and students generally should be considered. Students should be

289. See, e.g., supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text, for a general discussion of the
influence of commercialization on the institutions. I have some misgivings regarding the current
efforts of the NCAA, and for that matter, the CFA, to recognize, in a federated sense, a
super, quite commercial, division in intercollegiate athletics. In federating, these institutions
may simply be admitting that commercialization is an inevitable reality at some institutionsa reality that cannot be reversed.
290. Indeed, Proposal No. 1, as adopted at the 1985 special Convention, calling for a selfstudy requires that a topic of the self-study be a delineation of the "institutional purpose and
athletics philosophy" of the institution. See also Oliva, supra note 2, for an examination of
some of the values of coach-student relationships in the academic as opposed to commercial
athletic context.
291. For a discussion of the Proposal No. 1, the self-study process, see supra notes 121-26
and accompanying text.
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represented in the group making such decisions. If, however, institutions are
unwilling to permit students to participate in such a process, they should at
least consider the interests of student-athletes in discussing and preparing
the self-study, and, in those instances, students should be encouraged to
react to the document produced by the more exclusive group. Faculty,
themselves stewards of the academic mission of an institution, should be
actively concerned with their institutional self-study. If faculty members fail
to react at this juncture, they may find themselves in the precarious position
22
of students and faculty at SMU.
I also would suggest that student participation, both in terms of the
enforcement and the decisionmaking or legislative processes, be considered
at the NCAA level. Such participation could be effectuated in a number of
ways. The students could actually form a committee 293 or elect representatives who would be permitted to offer input and possibly even vote at
various levels in the decisionmaking process. Such a proposal would no
doubt be criticized on the ground that student activity might be shallow and
counter-productive, and that such input would require too much of a time
commitment on the part of student-athletes. The former objection seems
insufficient because the NCAA would not have to follow the students' advice
or input; rather, they would only have to listen to it. The latter objection,
however, may be more substantial in that such input would require additional
expenditures of time and effort on the part of student-athletes. Indeed, it
was just such an objection on the part of faculty members that helped create
the impetus for moving control of intercollegiate athletics away from the
student-athletes to other entities and ultimately to the NCAA in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 29 If this is a concern of educators,
however, they should also recognize the importance of remaining particularly
sensitive to the needs of student-athletes in every stage of their considerations,
from determining the athletic budget to administering the program. In this
regard, it is clear that student activity in the decisionmaking process could
itself be quite educational for student-athlete participants. If, nevertheless,
the presidents opt for not encouraging participation at a formal level by
actual students, they nonetheless should encourage it informally. They might,
for example, even consider creating a staff position or ombudsman at the
conference or the NCAA level which, much like the public defender system

292. For a discussion of the problems caused by SMU's recent debacle, see supra notes 217,
263.
293. Danny Manning, a talented basketball player at the University of Kansas, recently was
quoted as saying "[w]e [student-athletes] are the nucleus of the NCAA. I guess I basically feel
left out. I think they should take some time to listen to us. I think the athletes ought to form
a committee and create a full program .... ." Kaul, Sportsmanship Has Little Place in BigTime Collegiate Football, NCAA News, Dec. 8, 1986, at 3, col. 4.
294. See supra notes 23, 25 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of that movement
as an historical matter.

1987]

NCAA DEATH PENALTY

10533

in criminal law, would be designed to represent the interests of studentathletes. Indeed, given the actual participation by a student-athlete on the
Lukens Commission, 295 there is some contemporary precedent, to assure
student-athlete representation in the decisionmaking process at all levels.
Whatever course the presidents and others may take, it is certain that
even their own immediate interests would be well served by action on behalf
of student-athlete input in the contemporary dialogue regarding the reform
of intercollegiate athletics. Already there is much talk about increasing the
compensation received by student-athletes. 296 Such a move would run counter

295. Section 912 of Subtitle C, the Advisory Commission on the Comprehensive Education
of Intercollegiate Athletes of the Omnibus Crime Control Act-the Lukens Commissionprovides for a Commission made up of 17 members to investigate and advise Congress regarding
issues in intercollegiate athletics. One of the 17 members is to be "a current student-athlete at
a college or university." Id. at § 912(7). One membership each is also reserved for a member
of the NCAA, a college or university coach and a college or university athletic director. The
recognition of participation by student-athletes and the rights of student-athletes is certainly
one of the positive aspects of the legislation authored by Representative Lukens. See id at §
911. It is a first step toward student participation in the development, evaluation and enforcement
processes that ought to be duplicated at the institutional, conference and NCAA levels. Indeed,
if those other groups fail to recognize a role for the student-athlete, they will run a greater
risk of having some outside entity, governmental or otherwise, intervene to protect the rights
of student-athletes.
In this regard, A. Bartlett Giamatti, president of baseball's National League and former
president of Yale University, recently argued that it is critically important that institutions of
higher education have an academic philosophy that encompasses athletics and added that:
[Institutions of higher learning] think they are taking athletics very seriously
because they are making a lot of money from them. They are taking athletics
not very seriously at all, because they have emptied them of any educational
content ....

If the National Collegiate Athletic Association does not begin to regulate these
places, the federal government will. There are, after all, a number of bills in the
House of Representatives today-some of them coming out of the drug program
that was passed by both the House and the Seante about six months ago and
others independent-which call for setting up commissions on the problems of
intercollegiate athletics.
The country is finally getting sick of the fact that the very people who have
been charged with the education of the young have been unable or unwilling to
regulate their own standards, to clean up their own drug problem, and to live up
to their own high principles. If there is anybody that will run intercollegiate
athletics less well than the NCAA, it will be the federal government. The federal
government is about three years away from stepping into the mess that the colleges
and universities have created for themselves.
If the NCAA Doesn't Begin to Regulate Athletics, Chron. of Higher Educ., Mar. 11, 1987,
at 43.
296. Perhaps the most surprising piece of advocacy for increased compensation for studentathletes was written by Professor Robert L. Mahon, who declared that:
The lesson is this: we put the pressure on; we make the athletes play, so we
should see that they are properly rewarded. Fans-including the fans in college
administration-make the college sports system possible. Ve should stop pretending that going to college on an athletic scholarship is the just reward for
college sports. A start: athletes can be hired by a college team and given the
option to attend classes; those who don't graduate can be given a lump-sum
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to recent declarations at the national and NCAA level. 297 If, however, the
presidents fail to adopt measures to de-commercialize their athletic programs,
they will one day face stronger and more vocal efforts to increase studentathlete compensation on the ground that student-athletes should share in the
"profits" they help produce. It even has been suggested that the studentathletes unionize. 298 Indeed, in the fall of 1986, in front of a national

television audience, players demonstrated their support for unionization ef-

payment for their athletic performance.
Mahon, Life is Like Basketball, Newsweek, Feb. 23, 1987, at 10.
In a recent letter to the editor by Paul R. Lawrence appearing in the Wall Street Journal,
Lawrence argued that:
Why not pay the athletes for their performances? Under such a system the
marketplace, not the N.C.A.A., would determine the wages of athletes. Such a
plan has two appealing features.
First, recruiting would become more open and honest. Schools could readily
bid for athletes much as they do for professors, and competition similar to that
for research funds would emerge. This would end secret alumni deals and bring
more honesty to the recruiting process.
Second, the cost of administering intercollegiate athletics would decrease. Less
time and effort would be devoted by schools to recruiting and by the N.C.A.A.
to investigating its members. These savings could be devoted to ensuring that
athletes graduate.
End Cheating-Pay College Athletes, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1987, at 30, col. 3
This notion of compensating student-athletes is hardly new. Historically, in fact, players have
received compensation from the very inception of intercollegiate athletic participation. See
ADM INSTRATION OF UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS, supra note 16, at 8, 19. Indeed, in a recent study
of Division I players, 60% of those who filled out the questionaire "said they had no problem
with breaking payment regulations set by the NCAA ...." Some Athletes Not Averse to Being
Paid, NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 3, col. 3. That article also points out that "a majority
of lower-class athletes in all divisions, particularly lower-class black athletes, see nothing wrong
with accepting money to play college sports." Id. at 3, col. 4. Of course, if institutions in fact
merely use student-athletes for noneducational and commercial purposes, then there certainly
would not be anything improper with regard to demands for greater compensation of studentathletes. In the 1985 special Convention, however, the NCAA reasserted its commitment to the
Association's "current financial aid and related amateurism rules." See Proposal No. 9, supra
notes 201-04 and accompanying text. If the NCAA's reason for reasserting this principle was
merely to save money in operating their programs by collectively limiting competition in the
market for players, the players would be morally and legally (under antitrust law) justified in
asserting their rights to greater compensation. See, e.g., Comment, Compensationfor College
Athletes: A Run for More that the Roses, 22 SAN DINGo L. REv. 701 (1985); Koch, supra note
6. If, however, the NCAA membership is sincere in its effort to re-emphasize the academic
side in the balance between academics and highly commercialized athletic competition in intercollegiate athletics, such an action for increased compensation by a student-athlete would
not seem to be of merit. I doubt, moreover, that compensating student-athletes more would
limit that which is pernicious in college athletics-it would merely legalize it-and I am convinced
that it would do little to ensure higher graduation rates.
297. For a discussion of Proposal 9, adopted at the 1985 Special Convention, see supra notes
201-04.
298. Dick DeVenzio, a former basketball player at Duke University, is the head of the
Revenue Producing Major College Players Association and "is trying to form a union of college
athletics." Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 3, 1986, at 34.
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forts. 299 Such a move would be regrettable in that it would constitute but
another step toward recognizing the apparent irrevocability of the commer-

cialization of intercollegiate athletics. Yet if steps are not taken to limit the
movement in the direction of student unionization, such a move may become

more than just another idea.
Given these general statements, I next turn to a discussion of how the
various proposals adopted during the 1985 special Convention specifically
have affected, or may affect, the rights and interests of student-athletes.
Proposal No. 5, by terminating the eligibility of student violators, indicates

the resolve of the NCAA to hold student-athletes accountable for violations
of the NCAA rules. Resolution 5-1, however, which was narrowly defeated

at the special Convention, would have required "mandatory distribution to
all recruits and student-athletes of a summary of applicable NCAA rules
and regulations . . . and for mandatory review of the summary by each
varsity team meeting as a group."' ' 0

These actions collectively demonstrate the resolve on the part of the NCAA
membership to punish college athletes individually. Additionally, studentathletes are often punished indirectly when their institution is punished. It
is clear, for example, that the student-athletes and students generally at

SMU, regardless of whether or not they were involved in the violations, are
being punished or adversely affected by invocation of the "death penalty."

This is true even though provision was made for football players to transfer
to another institution without being forced to""red shirt," the normal practice
for transfers by student-athletes. 01
Given the direct and indirect punishment imposed on student-athletes when

an individual or institutional penalty is imposed, heightened concern must
be shown in terms of the protection afforded by the due process rights of
student-athletes. As with the administrators and coaches, it is clear that more

solicitude for the interests of student-athletes must be demonstrated, particularly at the enforcement level where penalties are assessed. Since student-

299. DeVenzio had called for a thirty-minute sitdown by the players. The student-athletes
instead chose to demonstrate their support in a somewhat less dramatic form-five players
from each team simply joined hands at midfield, dropped to their knees, and bowed their
heads as evidence of support for the effort to unionize major college athletics. Id. In addition
to the compensation and commercialization issues which serve as the major impetus behind the
unionization effort, it is clear that drug testing and related issues regarding the tights of studentathletes may also ultimately contribute to a movement in the direction of unionization.
300. See supra note 188.
301. Both the NCAA and the Southwest Conference have permitted SMU's football players
to be immediately eligible at transferee institutions. See SMU Transfers to Be Eligible, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at A24. SMU also has agreed to honor their scholarship commitments
to student-athletes at their institution. Even with these efforts to lessen the impact of the
penalties on innocent student-athletes, however, it is clear that the student-athletes will suffer
more than the mere inconvenience of transferring, both academically and athletically. See, e.g.,
NCAA's Tough Stance on SMU's Violations Shocks Many on Campus, Surprises Others,
Chron. of Higher Educ., Mar. 4, 1987, at 32-33.
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athletes have even less input into the enforcement and decisionmaking processes of the NCAA than coaches and administrators, their interests run a
greater risk of being unfairly jeopardized. While this fact would seem to
require greater legal solicitude in terms of due process, it unfortunately has
attracted little attention, with the majority of courts rejecting student-athlete
pleas of due process in most cases. 02 The institutions, the conferences and
the NCAA consequently have little legal incentive to extend due process to
student-athletes. That may change, however, if the trend toward commercialization continues and courts begin to recognize a property right in participation by student-athletes in intercollegiate athletics or if courts recognize
that punitive action stigmatizes an involved student-athlete thereby depriving
her of a liberty interest. All educational entities, nevertheless, ought to be
inclined, as a matter of moral and educational responsibility, to extend more
process to the student-athletes at every stage.of the proceedings.
In this regard, I would suggest offering legal representation or advice to
student-athletes when their rights might be impinged. Given a potential
conflict of interest between the institutions and the student-athletes, institutions have some moral and perhaps even legal responsibility to see that
303
the rights and interests of their student-athletes are adequately represented.
Short of providing adequate legal representation, institutions must at a
minimum show greater solicitude for the student-athletes' interests, as must
the NCAA, particularly with regard to sentencing. 304 The student-athletes
are afforded little input in the sentencing process, unless they can afford an
attorney or are supplied one by an institution (either their school or conference), which may well have interests that conflict with the rights and
interests of the student-athlete. As such, steps must be taken to assure greater.
input by and elucidation of the interests of affected students in the enforcement and legislative processes of the NCAA.
There is also a special need on the part of student-athletes, both as a
matter of due process and as a matter of protecting and defining their
interests, for institutions, conferences and the NCAA to articulate clear
theories of punishment and sentencing. At the broader theoretical level, it
is at least arguable that neither the consequentialist nor the nonconsequentialist theories fit as well as a moral good theory. 305 While the need to deter

302. See G.

SCHUBERT,

R. SMIH &. J. TmRENTAiDtu,

supra note 27, at 63-73.

303. The NCAA has shown an-increased willingness to recognize the institution's right to
offer such representation to student-athletes. It may be possible to facilitate the student-athlete's
rights in this regard by utilizing an ombudsman at the conference or national level. See supra
notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. What applies to institution, administration and coaches, applies with much greater force to student-athletes.
305. For a fuller explication of the moral good theory of punishment, see Lipkin, supra note
237. While that theory perhaps can be criticized on the ground that it is unrealistic or overly
idealistic in the conventional criminal context, it is certainly defensible in the context of the
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and even punish is important in enforcing the NCAA rules and regulations,

it is clear that institutions have an additional role with regard to their
students-that of educating them as autonomous individuals. To rashly
punish that student-athlete as a scapegoat for the institution's own failures

is a reprehensible act. Care therefore must be taken to recognize the rights
of the student-athlete in the NCAA's enforcement process. Student-athletes
should have the opportunity to participate in some form at the hearing and

sentencing phases of the enforcement process. The student-athlete also should
be given a role in the decisionmaking process at all levels. When such
participation is faciliated, a long and meaningful step will have been taken
toward enshrining academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics. The Presi-

dents Commission and the NCAA are well-positioned to take such a dramatic
move-it can only be hoped that they will not shirk their responsibility as
educators in this regard. If they do, they will have done much to abdicate
their legitimate right to rule in the world of intercollegiate athletics.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The general efforts on the part of the Presidents Commission and the
NCAA to restore academic integrity to intercollegiate athletic programs,

commencing in significant measure with the special Convention of 1985, are
to be applauded. In that special Convention, the presidents, with overwhelming support from the NCAA membership body, collectively sought to

implement a series of reforms in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Those initial reform efforts, which are largely punitive in nature, were
adopted to counter-balance commercial and related non-academic pressures

that have plagued intercollegiate athletics from its inception.
These initial efforts have been followed recently by proposals designed to

ensure cost containment in intercollegiate athletics, 306 to initiate a national
dialogue regarding the compatability of intercollegiate athletics with the

student-athlete, where the institution and at least indirectly the NCAA and the conference have
a fiduciary, educative function to fulfill with regard to their student-athletes.
To permit the autonomous concerns and interests of implicated student-athletes to be considered would constitute, at the very least, a great lesson in the importance of fairness and
due process for the students. It would do much to teach the importance of participation as
well as reinforcing the role of personal responsibility on the part of the student-athlete. It
would seem that self-reliance and procedural fairness are two very important values that
educators are commissioned to teach.
306. See Lederman, NCAA PresidentsPanel, Unable to Agree on Reforms, Proposes Few
Rule Changes, Chron. of Higher Educ., April 8, 1987, at 35. This article discusses the agenda
of the special convention to be held in June of 1987. It is noted that the members of the
Presidents Commission, unable to agree among themselves, offered a "small and somewhat
watered-down package of'cost-containment recommendations for the association's special convention in June." Id.
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educational values of colleges and universities °7 and to authorize a series of
comprehensive studies regarding the effects of participation in intercollegiate

athletics on the student-athlete and the collegiate institution.0 8 While heartening, these combined efforts are but a beginning, and doubts necessarily
persist as to whether the resolve of the presidents and other supporters of

such reform measures can sustain their effort in light of countervailing
economic and political pressures. In the highly commercialized and popularized milieu of intercollegiate athletics, exuberant and often powerful
boosters of a win-at-all-costs philosophy continue to place intense pressure
on administrators, coaches and student-athletes. Indeed, presidents will have
to resist the allure that generally attends the financial success accompanying
a winning athletic tradition. A failure to resist this temptation will result in

a dissipation of the reform movement initiated during the summer of 1985.
If the Presidents Commission and other supporters of reform can maintain
their resolve to complete a task just begun, and can encourage like-minded

individuals and groups to, support them in resisting the seemingly natural
inclination toward commercialization, this coalition may yet succeed in fully
restoring a sense of academic integrity to intercollegiate athletics at all levels.
To do so, these individuals will need support from students, faculty and

alumni who are committed to an academic orientation. Given the visibility
and media attention that supplements an "athletics first" mentality, the

307. Unable to agree on a number of issues, the Presidents Commission decided to initiate
a national dialogue regarding the compatibility of intercollegiate athletics with the values of
higher education. This notion of a national debate or dialogue was presented to the Presidents
Commission in a draft of a white paper presented in April of 1987 by Chancellor Heyman of
the Unviersity of California at Berkeley. See Commission Adds New Dimension to Special
Convention, NCAA News, Apr. 8, 1987, at 1. With regard to this dialogue, Chancellor Slaughter
of the University of Maryland at College Park and current chair of the Presidents Commission,
stated that, given broad disagreement among the Presidents on a number of critical issues,
"We [the Presidents Commission] need input from a variety of people: athletic directors,
coaches, athletes. It will be an opportunity for all of us to receive some edification on these
issues." Lederman, supra note 306, at 36. He added that, "It is our belief that this is a dialogue
that will go on for some time. There's a sense that most of the easy things have been done."
Id.
308. This resolution, which was presented to the Special Convention in June of 1987, asks
the membership to authorize a series of studies "of a magnitude and consequence heretofore
not undertaken," calling for the indepth examination of a number of issues. See Commission
Adds New Dimension to Special Convention, supra note 307, at 1, 10. The subjects to be
studied include, but are not necessarily limited to, a comparison of student-athletes' college
experience with that of students in general, student-athlete graduation rates, student-athletes'
opinions of their college experience and the effect of athletic programs on institutions of higher
education. Id. at 10.
These studies provide an exciting prospect. With the information obtained as a result of
these studies, the Presidents will be well positioned to effectuate the kinds of reforms that will
insure academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics. It is particularly heartening that student
input will be sought and considered. Indeed, such a process may well enable the Presidents to
consider and ultimately resolve a number of the issues raised in this Article.
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challenge to maintain academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics is immense.
Recent efforts to penalize violations of NCAA rules and to contain future
costs suggest a positive move toward ensuring academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics. In one sense, even the presidents' willingness to punish
themselves and their institutions for involvement in infractions may indicate
a long-term, collective commitment to the value of academic integrity. The
job has just begun, however, and there are many sensitive issues that still
must be resolved before a final verdict can be rendered.
To succeed in facilitating meaningful reform, the presidents and others
ultimately will have to employ the self-study procedure, budgetary control
and other related processes that are now in place to ascertain what the
academic purposes of their athletic programs are or should be and how
those purposes can best be effectuated. In initiating reform proposals, the
presidents and others must be careful to take into account the rights and
interests of personnel and student-athletes.
Student-athletes are often under-represented in the enforcement and legislative processes related to intercollegiate athletics at the institutional, conference and national levels. This underrepresentation effectively means their
rights and interests frequently are discounted by those wielding power. In
particular, these powers must be sensitive to the academic interests of their
students. To compromise those interests is to abdicate one's responsibility
as an educator and would constitute a moral, if not a legal, breach of the
presidents' fiduciary responsibility to their students.

